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1.  Introduction and Methodology  
Black classicism, sometimes called classica Africana, is a relatively new area of 
research in both classical and English literary studies. Since the Black Athena controversy of 
1987, classica Africana has remained divisive, viewed as either revisionism or an implic it 
admission of the whiteness of classics proper. The historic construction of the classical tradition 
as both white and a marker of universal humanism has similarly made its reception an important 
but fraught topic in black diasporic literature and criticism. In African American literature, the 
problems of classica Africana relate to a tension between integrationist and segregationist 
positions (Rankine, Ulysses in Black 29-30). Former slaves such as Frederick Douglass and 
Phillis Wheatley used their knowledge of Latin and Greek literature to convince white 
audiences of abolition; the contemporary African American reader and writer might therefore 
resist engagement with the classics as a standard against which one’s humanity is judged. 
However, a refusal to engage with the classics risks accepting its construction as white property. 
The central relationship between American identity and the classics means that such a refusal 
would also deny the central role African Americans play in shaping American culture. Ralph 
Ellison and Toni Morrison are two African American authors who, I argue, work to undermine 
the polarization of these positions. Their reception of the classics is an important but relative ly 
neglected feature of their work. For example, both the nameless protagonist of Ellison’s 
Invisible Man (1952) and Milkman Dead in Morrison’s Song of Solomon (1977) invite 
comparisons with Homer’s Odysseus; Odysseus himself is the adaptable hero par exemple, 
whose epithet polutropo[s] (1.1) also evokes linguistic translation and transformation. Ellison 
and Morrison strategically engage with classical literature to destabilize the construction of both 
the classical and American traditions in terms of whiteness; as such they renegotiate not only 
the classics, but also American culture.  
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This thesis examines the ways in which Ellison’s Invisible Man and Morrison’s Song of 
Solomon engage with Greek and Latin literature. I show that both authors allude to the classics 
in their novels, which can be considered examples of black classicism. More importantly, I 
consider the impact of these classical references, how they shape our interpretation of the novels 
and comment on the classical tradition itself. I divide the following two chapters between 
Ellison and Morrison, using a similar substructure for both chapters to exploit the 
interconnections between the novels. Taking the authors’ essays on the function of myth as my 
point of departure, I move to a close reading of the novels, using reception theory to consider 
their relation to the classical tradition and to each other. Invisible Man and Song of Solomon 
closely align with the classical genre of epic in their presentation of a male protagonist who 
departs on a heroic journey. However, the novels refer to a range of classical sources, includ ing 
tragedy (indeed, the classical epic also incorporates other genres). I therefore divide my textual 
analysis broadly between epic and tragedy, but I also track recurring tropes such as nostos 
(homecoming) and katabasis (journey to the underworld). I compare and contrast Ellison’s and 
Morrison’s reception of the classics alongside their treatment of themes such as identity, 
difference, family and home. I hope to show that the novelists both foreground the historica l 
role of the classics for African Americans and challenge its use as a symbol of cultura l 
hegemony. In the process, they undermine underlying notions of cultural purity and canon 
formation. In using the classics to explore the contradictions of African American identity, 
Ellison and Morrison destabilize the polarities which trouble “black classicism” to transform 
both the classics and the foundations of American identity.  
Reception theory follows from the premise that “meaning is realized at the point of 
reception” (Martindale, Redeeming the Text 3). A text’s meaning is therefore constructed within 
the reader’s “horizon of expectations,” which includes their knowledge of other texts (Jauss 
13). Through this intertextuality, reception becomes a dynamic process: a text can read and 
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redefine a previous text; equally, it can determine the framework within which later texts are 
read. These ideas of dialogue and appropriation are particularly apparent within the hierarchica l 
tradition of classical epic, where each text competes to be “first” (primus) by rewriting the genre 
in its own image. For example, Ovid plays with the dynamics of genre by presenting his own 
version of the Aeneid in his Metamorphoses (13.623-14.609). Ovid minimizes the highlights of 
the Aeneid, reducing the Dido episode to five lines (14.77–81); on the other hand, he develops 
Virgil’s references to metamorphosis into episodes which take over the narrative. Stephen 
Hinds argues that Ovid expands these “Virgilian stories of metamorphosis” (105) in an 
aggressive move of poetic appropriation: “Rather than construct himself as an epigonal reader 
of the Aeneid, Ovid is constructing Virgil as a hesitant precursor of the Metamorphoses . . . in 
Virgil these myths [of metamorphosis] are fragmented, scattered, unresolved: not until Ovid’s 
own poem are they gathered into perfection and system” (106). Ovid uses his belatedness to 
launch a “bid for teleological control” (106) and paradoxically assert his own primacy in 
relation to Virgil. This primacy is built on a reformulation of the epic genre with Ovidian 
metamorphosis as its central theme. The dynamics of the epic tradition are therefore both 
conservative (based on primacy and origins) and potentially transformative (it is the later text, 
not the former, which defines the genre). Still, the structure of the reception of epic poses 
problems to writers who wish to challenge canon formation and cultural hegemony. Since the 
epic works in terms of primacy and belatedness, how can writers transform the tradition and 
still challenge its hierarchical assumptions? 
Just as the epic was generally considered the prime genre in Greek and Roman culture 
(with the exception of Aristotle’s Poetics), so Greek and Roman texts have been used as the 
ultimate standard of literary achievement (as the name “classics” suggests). In the context of 
black classicism, classical texts have been used as “weapons of cultural imperialism, forced 
upon persons of African descent as the model of culture, and used to supplant indigenous 
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literature” (Wetmore 7). In America, the classics were used as a standard of universal human 
values against which black humanity was measured: “Proponents of integration (white and 
black alike) used classicism to affirm that African Americans could take their place alongside 
the American elite – as human and refined” (Rankine, Ulysses in Black 30). Thus Wheatley’s 
master defended her humanity with her “inclination to learn the Latin tongue” (8) and Douglass 
used classical rhetoric to persuade audiences towards abolition. Similarly, the post-
emancipation debate about the role of classics for educating American citizens had a racial 
aspect. Whereas Booker T. Washington prioritized industrial training, W.E.B. Du Bois 
presented citizenship as a cultivation of humanity, which included classicism (Rankine 26). In 
the Black Arts movement of the 1960s and 70s, many writers rejected the classics for a 
deliberately Afrocentric aesthetics. The backlash to black classicism can be understood within 
this context, as a rejection of having one’s humanity up for debate (Rankine 31). Still, the 
classics need not be accepted as white cultural property: this neglects the work of black 
classicists such as William Scarborough, as well as the classicism of writers like Wheatley and 
Douglass. Indeed, both Ellison and Morrison experienced a classical education: Ellison took 
four years of Latin at high school and Morrison minored in classics at Howard University. In 
addition, Martin Bernal’s seminal study Black Athena (first published in 1987) contests the 
European origins of classical civilization. Bernal argues that Greek civilization was primarily 
influenced not by Europe but by African and Asiatic cultures (although the backlash to his study 
confirmed for many that classics remains an institutionally racist discipline).  
Similarly, studies of the classics and African American literature must acknowledge and 
negotiate the hierarchy implied by “classical reception.” As several critics note, the problem is 
how to avoid affirming classics as the property of Europe, and Greece as the pure origin of 
Western thought, whilst acknowledging the use of classics to justify European white supremacy 
(van Weyenberg 44). Critics should be wary of valuing an African American author’s literary 
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achievement insofar as they use the classics, or reading only for classical allusions as if these 
are valuable in themselves. Such approaches privilege Greek and Roman over African 
American cultures and reinforce the cultural hierarchy so often contested by the works in 
question. Another problem with reading African American receptions with a classical “origina l” 
in mind is that it reinforces a sense of cultural otherness, explaining “foreign” black culture in 
white Western terms (Wetmore 21). Or studies compare African American and Greek cultures 
to posit universal mythic patterns (which they usually base on classical texts).  
This study hopes to negotiate the many pitfalls of writing about classical reception in 
African American literature. Firstly, I try to frame Ellison and Morrison’s classical reception 
within the broader themes of their work, rather than making their classicism the sole focus and 
end goal of this thesis. By comparing the two authors, I explore the differences between them 
rather than assuming African American literature as a monolith. There are specific intertextua l 
links between Ellison and Morrison, beyond a classical context, which make them an 
appropriate choice of comparison (in particular the structural echoes between the two novels 
and Morrison’s reception of Ellison). I do not wish merely to appeal to their status as African 
American writers who use the classics – I am interested in the specific dynamics between them.  
I also explore the historical context of African American classical reception, both as presented 
within the works and through their differences. In this way I hope to avoid privileging a 
conception of universal myth over historically and politically specific meanings. At the same 
time, I use an intertextual framework to avoid reading Ellison and Morrison in restrictedly 
sociological terms. Both authors have a tradition of being read this way, and have spoken 
against it. As Ellison writes, “the main source of my novels is other novels” (“Interview with 
Isiah Reed” 56). Finally, a comparative study can imply an opposition between African 
American and classical culture, which infers an underlying assumption of cultural purity. This 
thesis hopes to show that the novels in question effectively challenge the idea of cultural purity. 
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Both Ellison and Morrison show a commitment to cultural hybridity and difference, even as 
they exploit the similarities between African American and classical cultures to powerful effect.  
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2. Ralph Ellison’s Invisible Man 
2.1. Myth and Ritual 
Much of Ellison’s reception, both positive and negative, has hinged on the idea that he 
aimed to write apolitical fiction. His focus on literary aesthetics instead of politics and 
articulation of a universal American humanism makes Ellison vulnerable to criticism of 
neglecting his socio-political responsibilities as an African American writer. Ellison’s 
reputation as a modernist has not helped matters: it suggests that Ellison accepts an inherently 
racist and elitist tradition, which limits transformation to the private, aesthetic sphere (Nadel 
24). Patrice Rankine notes that Ellison’s classicism is often viewed within this framework, as a 
retreat from political concerns and tacit acceptance of Western literary hierarchies (Ulysses in 
Black 81). However, Ellison appropriates classical myth for highly political purposes. His 
understanding of ritual adds a socio-political force to his depictions of rites, sacrifices and 
dream-states, which work to “restructure the collective unconscious” (Rankine 126). Moreover, 
Ellison’s reworking of the Ulysses myth riffs on Homer, Joyce and African American folklore. 
In so doing Ellison critiques the whitening of the classical tradition and argues for the 
integration of African Americans in American politics and culture. However, it must be noted 
that Ellison’s model of integration does not presuppose universal humanism as we commonly 
conceive it – that is, a model of Western culture over and above all others. Rather, Ellison 
imagines a kind of humanism central to the American democratic promise: the “puzzle of the 
one-and-the-many” (“Hidden Name and Complex Fate” 207). His reception of the classics is 
both political and existential: Ellison not only imagines new possibilities for American culture 
but also moves from the American dream to one of human relations as a whole. However, 
Ellison is also ambivalent in that such a dream remains a dream; Invisible Man stays to some 
extent trapped underground, his homecoming postponed beyond the novel’s reach.  
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Ellison’s classical reception should be understood within the context of his conception 
of myth. In his essay “On Initiation Rites and Power,” Ellison references Lord Raglan’s The 
Hero: A Study in Tradition, Myth and Drama (1936). Raglan argues that the narrative of the 
hero recurs in many different cultures. This is because the hero’s narrative solidified into a 
universal archetype, or “monomyth,” through ritual retellings. Such rituals serve to satisfy the 
human desire for universal ideals. Raglan’s conception of myth has a Jungian basis: myths and 
archetypes link the conscious level of human experience to the collective unconscious they all 
share (Rankine, Ulysses in Black 125-6). Ellison claims he was reading Raglan during the 
writing of Invisible Man. He describes Raglan as “concerned with the manner in which myth 
became involved with the histories of living persons, became incorporated into their personal 
legends” (“On Initiation Rites” 524). The archetype of the hero is thus also the narrative of 
“great leaders” (524). Ellison thus locates his literary interest in the ritual function of myth in 
the “historical moment” of writing Invisible Man, which he characterizes as a crisis of African 
American leadership: “I was very much involved with the  question of just why our Negro 
leadership was never able to enforce its will. Just what was there about the structure of 
American society that prevented Negroes from throwing up effective leaders?” (525).  Ellison 
then explored this social question through the lens of literary myth and ritual. This led him to 
notice the rituals which underlie social interactions. He gives the example of the “battle royal” 
as “a rite which could be used to project certain racial divisions into the society and reinforce 
the idea of white racial superiority” (529). Ellison sees social interactions as structured by 
rituals which produce and reinforce social values (Rankine 126). Writers can therefore use 
myths, rituals and symbols not only to depict social relations but also, potentially, to shift them 
(Rankine 122). 
Ellison is usually taken as using Raglan’s conception of myth unironically. However, 
his reading of Raglan raises several questions. Firstly, if myth is monolithic, universalizing and 
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idealizing, how does one represent difference in the collective imagination? The American 
writer’s problem is that he or she must represent difference on a universal level, incorporating 
“that complexity [of American diversity] into his work in the form of symbolic action and 
metaphor” (“On Initiation Rites” 525). Issues of similarity and difference are also relevant to 
the figure of the African American leader, who must be both an outstanding individual and a 
representative of the group. Ellison’s juxtaposition of Raglan with the crisis of African 
American leadership suggests that the archetype of the hero fails to empower this particular 
group. Ellison tries to explain this phenomenon, suggesting that African Americans are 
marginalized through ritualized social interactions, which feed into and are shaped by the 
mythic imagination or “collective unconscious” of society. Raglan’s model of the hero moves 
to self-identification through rites of passage, whereby the hero distinguishes himself from 
other people (identifying a “self” through differentiation from an “other”). Must all social rituals 
work this way, creating identity for one group at the expense of another? Furthermore, if one is 
not acknowledged in social interactions and the collective imagination which structures them, 
is it possible to conceive a sense of self independently? Indeed, the basis of myth in the 
collective unconscious could infer a lack of agency and potential for change. Ellison targets the 
classics in order to change existing myths, exploring the writer’s agency to give new meaning 
to old material.  
Ellison invokes ideas of myth and heroism through the legend of the Founder in Chapter 
2 of Invisible Man. The Founder’s “bronze statue” (36) recalls classical art, evoking the 
historical role of the classics for African Americans: Douglass and other leaders presented 
themselves as heroes in order to represent the humanity of the group. However, the statue also 
recalls white Founding Fathers such as Thomas Jefferson, who styled themselves after classical 
heroes (L. Wright 223) – indeed, Invisible Man also refers to the Founder’s statue as “the cold 
Father symbol” (IM 36). Ellison invokes an Oedipal model of fatherhood: the statue stands at a 
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point where “three roads converge” (35), recalling the three-way crossroad where Oedipus kills 
his father (Sophocles, Oedipus Rex 730). Ellison’s allusion to Oedipus invokes ideas of heroism 
as well: Oedipus was for Raglan the archetypal hero, whose narrative fulfils the most of his 
mythic patterns (Raglan 213-14). The ambiguity of the statue is further explored as Invis ib le 
Man describes 
his hands outstretched in the breathtaking gesture of lifting a veil that flutters in hard, 
metallic folds above the face of a kneeling slave; and I am standing puzzled, unable to 
decide whether the veil is really being lifted, or lowered more firmly into place; whether 
I am witnessing a revelation or a more efficient blinding. (IM 36) 
The adjective “breathtaking” connotes both awe and murder (Schaub 137); “blinding” locates 
the novel’s themes of insight and invisibility within a tragic Oedipal framework. The “folds” 
of the veil also echo the blindfolds Invisible Man and the other participants of the battle royal 
are forced to wear in the preceding chapter (IM 21; Millichap 195). Likewise, the “veil” alludes 
to Du Bois’ metaphor for the theft of self-consciousness from African Americans, who can only 
see themselves through the white imagination (Schaub 137). Invisible Man wonders if myths 
of heroic leaders and racial uplift empower African Americans or keep them kneeling through 
hero worship, unaware of the realities of racial discrimination. 
Ellison depicts the myth of the Founder as having a ritual function. Invisible Man tells 
how “millionaires descended from the North on Founder’s Day each spring” (IM 36), 
suggesting a yearly rite of renewal, and describes Norton as a “symbol of the Great Traditions” 
(37). Moreover, from his position as narrator Invisible Man remembers the chapel scene in 
unflattering ritual terms. The students’ faces are “frozen in solemn masks” (108), their songs 
representing “[a]n affirmation accepted and ritualized, an allegiance recited for the peace it 
imparted, and then perhaps loved. Loved as the defeated come to love the symbols of their 
conquerors” (109). Invisible Man bitterly links myth and ritual: “Here upon this stage the black 
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rite of Horatio Alger was performed to God’s own acting script, with millio naires . . . not only 
acting out the myth of their goodness . . . but themselves, these virtues concretely!” (109). The 
church service acts out the rags-to-riches narrative popularized by Alger; such performances 
dramatize and reinforce the “benevolence and authority” of the trustees (109). Invisible Man 
ironically juxtaposes the pagan connotations of “black rite” against the Christian setting, with 
the trustees setting themselves up as “God[s].” We can also read “black rite” to mean a black 
version of the rags-to-riches rite of passage, itself a literary formula ritualized through repetition 
(not least in Alger’s oeuvre).  
Critics have noted that Homer A. Barbee’s sermon draws heavily on Raglan’s archetype 
of the hero (Millichap 198; J. Wright 165). Joseph Millichap notes that “the founder fulfils over 
half of [Raglan’s heroic events] – ranging from an unusual conception, a lost childhood, a 
fruitful leadership, a mysterious death, and a memorial sepulcher” (198). Barbee uses these 
mythic patterns in combination with repetition: “You know of his brilliant career”; “I’m sure 
you’ve heard it time and time again” (117). This frames his narrative as a ritual repetition of a 
story within the group; however, this repetition works on the level of literary memory as well, 
as Barbee repeats tropes from other narratives to insert the Founder’s story onto the symbolic 
level of myth. Invisible Man describes Barbee’s sermon as “renewing the dream in our hearts” 
(IM 116), and his vocabulary evokes both the American dream and Ellison’s view of myth as 
structuring the collective unconscious. The word “renewing” suggests both repetition and 
rebirth; and indeed, Barbee’s narrative is marked by repeated deaths and births, departures and 
returns, mirrored in the rise and fall of his voice (124). His sermon stages symbolic journeys 
between the social world above and the unconscious below. In the process it reinforces the 
oppositions of light and dark, knowledge and ignorance, insight and blindness, to underline the 
trustees’ benevolence in raising the black students out of darkness.  
Baxter 14 
 
Whilst Barbee uses the classics as part of a universal mythic matrix, his specific 
references ironically undermine its applicability to African American politics. Millichap argues, 
“As a preacher, Barbee’s allegorical images of the founder’s pilgrimage are Christian, but a 
universal pattern of the hero’s life cycle emerges in Classical terms as well” (198). Barbee’s 
founding narrative of “this godly man’s labors” (IM 117) evokes Aeneas, whose piety (pietas) 
and hard work (labor) enables him to found Rome (Virgil, Aeneid 1.10). Similarly, Barbee’s 
description of the Founder as a “moving orator . . . [who] returns after years to this country” 
types him as an Odysseus (IM 117). However, the speech’s classical references ironically fail 
in an African American context. Barbee holds up “this slave, this black Aristotle” as an example 
of “sweet patience” to the students (117). However, this ironically clashes with Aristotle’s 
theory of natural slavery (Politics 1.1254b16–21) and the Southern practice of giving slaves 
classical names (an attempt to justify slavery through classical models). In addition, Barbee 
constructs the Founder as another Julius Caesar. His death is marked by the appearance of a 
shooting star: “there came the burst of a single jewel-like star, and I saw it . . . streak down the 
cheek of that coal-black sky” (IM 125). In Ovid’s Metamorphoses, Julius Caesar is transformed 
into a comet as part of his apotheosis (14.749). However, Barbee’s allusion is undermined by 
his earlier use of the Founder as a model for “[r]endering unto Caesar what was Caesar’s” (IM 
118), which implicitly admits Caesar as a symbol of white rule. Indeed, the Biblical phrase 
refers to Julius’ successor, Augustus, whose succession is ultimately reinforced by the 
apotheosis myth: Ovid satirically remarks, “lest [Augustus] be created from mortal seed, 
[Julius] had to be made a god” (14.760-1). For Barbee’s narrative is also a succession myth. 
The Founder’s myth allows Bledsoe to be constructed as a humble successor, whose leadership 
becomes a keeping of his “pledge to the Founder” with conscientious stewardship” (IM 130). 
Similarly, Augustus posed as princeps (first citizen) rather than king in order to keep his hold 
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on the Senate, and Bledsoe boasts to the narrator, “I’m still the king down here. I don’t care 
how much it appears otherwise” (IM 139). 
Furthermore, Ellison displaces the primacy of Homer from his narrative in this scene. 
Ellison emphasizes the orality of Barbee’s narrative: his “playing upon the whole audience” 
(121) evokes musical and dramatic performance as he “act[s] out his words” (122). Ellison uses 
musical terminology: his hands outspread as through he were leading an orchestra into a . . . 
diminuendo. Then his voice . . . accelerated” (124). Barbee uses call and response, both within 
and without his narrative. Ellison therefore creates links between the African American and 
Homeric oral traditions. However, when Invisible Man asks his neighbor who Barbee is, he 
reacts with a comic “look of annoyance, even of outrage” reminiscent of a reaction to someone’s 
ignorance of the canon (121); the reaction puts an ironic spin on “Reverend.” The name Barbee 
is suggestive of “bard,” as well as the “barb” in his words. His alphabetic initials suggest a 
command of the rudiments and origins of language. However, they also rework those of A. 
Herbert Bledsoe. Indeed, Invisible Man has the uncanny “notion that part of Dr Bledsoe had 
arisen and moved forward, leaving his other part smiling in his chair” (115). Moreover, Barbee 
styles himself like a blind prophet: like Oedipus or Tiresias, he “staggered under the awful 
burden of that knowledge and I cursed myself because I bore it” (124). However, at the end of 
the speech, Barbee falls, his glasses slip and Invisible Man sees “the blinking of sightless eyes” 
(131). Valerie Smith suggests that the delay of this information suggests the disillusionment of 
Invisible Man as narrator (218): he believed Barbee in the chapel, but now rejects the vision he 
offers. Ellison displaces Homer as the third-person narrator of his hero’s journey, suggesting 
that monomythic narratives inevitably reinforce the power of others. Homer A. Barbee fails to 
empower this protagonist, who wonders at the end of the chapter, “How could I ever return 
home?” (IM 132). It is telling that Barbee’s speech marks the point at which Invisible Man’s 
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narration becomes less reflective and more focused on the present, as he embraces his role as 
both narrator and protagonist.  
2.2. Epic: Nostos and Katabasis 
Critics have long noticed links between Invisible Man and Homer’s Odyssey. John Stark 
reads the Odyssey as the principal intertext for Invisible Man in his 1973 essay, “Ellison’s Black 
Odyssey” (60). He suggests that Invisible Man’s adventures correspond to those of Odysseus. 
However, “Odysseus always wins; the invisible man, although he learns in the process, always 
loses” (63). Ellison uses the Odyssey to show that “for the ancient Greeks, but not for 
contemporary Black Americans, heroic aspirations can be achieved” (Stark 60).  Whilst it is 
true that initiation rites such as the battle royal fail to empower Invisible Man, Stark’s 
conclusion seems problematic. Indeed, Rankine argues that Ellison uses the Odyssey to show 
the heroic aspects of Invisible Man’s experience (Ulysses in Black 134). Ellison explicitly links 
Invisible Man to the Odyssey in his essay, “Change the Joke and Slip the Yoke.” In response to 
Edgar Hyman’s reading of Invisible Man’s grandfather as a minstrel figure, Ellison writes, “So 
intense is Hyman’s search for archetypal forms that he doesn’t see the narrator’s grandfather in 
Invisible Man is no more engaged in a ‘darky act’ than was Ulysses in Polyphemus’ cave” 
(109). Invisible Man’s grandfather advises his son, “[A]gree ’em to death and destruction, let 
’em swoller you till they vomit or bust wide open” (IM 16). Rankine argues that this language 
recalls Odysseus’ confrontation with Polyphemus, who swallows his men and “vomits wine 
and human flesh” (Homer, Odyssey 9. 373-4; Rankine 133). Ellison uses myth to represent the 
grandfather’s epic heroism and African Americans who experience double-consciousness as 
“full human being exploring their possibilities” (Rankine 129). Conversely, “society’s inability 
to see individuals like Invisible Man’s grandfather as full human subjects parallels the 
Cyclops’s blindness” (Rankine 133). Throughout the novel, Invisible Man’s opponents are 
characterized in Cyclopean terms (Rankine 135), from the drunken spectators of the battle royal 
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(IM 20) to the doctors in the hospital (223) to one-eyed Brother Jack, who “squinted . . . with 
Cyclopean irritation” (456). Invisible Man moves from Cyclopean blindness to Odysseus- like 
trickery, self-identification and blinding of his opponents (Rankine 135). His character arc thus 
mirrors that of Odysseus. For Odysseus’s identity as a hero emerges through repeated 
encounters with the other: “The hero struggles against everything that is not he, against his anti-
self, as it were, in his process of becoming” (Rankine 50). For Rankine, Invisible Man mainta ins 
the structure of the Odyssey, whereby its hero engages in conflicts which serve as rites of 
passage. However, I argue that Ellison also interrogates this model of heroic identity; the 
Ulysses paradigm also constitutes one of the “archetypal forms” of which he is suspicious 
(“Change the Joke and Slip the Yoke” 109).  
Invisible Man also uses the epic trope of katabasis, the hero’s journey to and return from 
the underworld. As Rankine suggests, Invisible Man is structured like a katabasis: the 
protagonist retreats underground to write his story, until he is “drawn upward again” into the 
world of human interaction (IM 559; Rankine, “Classical Reception and Nothingness” 465). 
The katabasis motif might also parallel Odysseus’ escape from Polyphemus’ cave, though 
Rankine does not link these strands of his argument explicitly. Rankine reads Invisible Man’s 
katabasis as a symbolic paradigm of African American identity formation (Ulysses in Black 88-
92). The individual rejects the myths of the white establishment, including classics, for a purely 
black identity. However, this model of purity is also restrictive, and the person who “returns 
from the black (w)hole” ultimately recognizes themselves as part of a (now-expanded) 
American identity. His or her katabasis is therefore also a nostos, insofar as the person 
recognizes America as their “home” and the classics as part of their own cultural identity.  
However, Rankine’s analysis is complicated by the repeated moments of katabasis 
within Invisible Man’s narrative. Even within his hole, Invisible Man listens to music, where 
“not only entered the music but descended, like Dante, into its depths” (IM 8). Dante is led into 
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Hell by Virgil; at the end of the novel, the Virgilian Sibyl leads Invisible Man into the Harlem 
riot. The surrealism of Invisible Man’s descent – “beneath the swiftness of the hot tempo there 
was a slower tempo and a cave” (8) – also suggests a psychological descent into the 
unconscious. Indeed, this combination of mythic and psychological descent is characteristic of 
the katabases in Invisible Man, and recalls Raglan’s analysis of myth in terms of Jungian 
archetypes. Similarly, Millichap reads multiple katabases in Invisible Man, including his 
subway ride into Harlem: “In the psychological terms employed by Carl Jung, Lord Raglan, 
and Joseph Campbell, the fearful subway ride becomes an image of the journey into the 
subconscious. In literary terms, it recalls the katabases of Homer’s Odysseus and Virgil’s 
Aeneas” (199). The repeated katabases of Invisible Man make the trope more open-ended than 
in Rankine’s analysis. This repetition can be read as both modernist and ritualistic, as in Homer 
A. Barbee’s sermon. However, Ellison’s improvisatory mode of reception also exemplifies the 
“signifyin(g)” which Henry Louis Gates Jr. sees as characteristic of black literature. Gates 
defines signifyin(g) as a collection of uniquely black “rhetorical tropes . . . includ[ing] making, 
loud-talking, testifying, calling out (of one’s name), sounding, rapping, playing the dozens, and 
so on” (239). Signifying frequently involves misdirection, trickery, and hidden meanings (239). 
It highlights the contingency of language and draws attention to the Saussurian gap between 
signifier and signified. As such it illustrates Gates’s point that the “blackness” of a text is located 
in its aesthetics rather than its essence (40). Ellison’s “riffing” on classical epic both invokes 
and destabilizes its models of identity, heroism and homecoming. In particular, Ellison uses 
katabasis to connect myth and ritual, the unconscious, heroism and difference. Nevertheless, 
Ellison’s signifying on katabasis also denies closure to Invisible Man’s narrative: at the end of 
the novel, the protagonist’s successful ascent from the underworld remains in doubt. Invisible 
Man confuses the tropes of katabasis and anabasis, racial uplift and tragic fall, exile and 
homecoming, so that the reader too must “become acquainted with ambivalence” (IM 10). 
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As psychological descents, Invisible Man’s katabases have epistemologica l 
significance. After leaving the hospital, Invisible Man realizes he is “no longer afraid. Not of 
important men, not of trustees and such” (IM 241). He compares his use of ironic signifying to 
a psychological journey into the unconscious: “perhaps I was catching up with myself and had 
put into words feelings which I had hitherto suppressed” (241). His simile alludes to the slave’s 
anamnesis in Plato’s Meno: “Like the servant about whom I'd read in psychology class who, 
during a trance, had recited pages of Greek philosophy which she had overheard one day while 
she worked” (241). The simile distances the classics from African American experience, insofar 
as it places Greek philosophy in parallel with an “alien personality” (240). However, insofar as 
Invisible Man recollects his own feelings, he reclaims a “hitherto suppressed” claim to Greek 
culture alongside his ironic, signifying wordplay with the doctor (239). Invisible Man’s 
recognition is also marked as tragic fall: “I felt that I would fall, had fallen” (240). Beside him 
“a young platinum blonde nibbled at a red Delicious apple” (241), suggesting a Biblical link 
between tragedy and knowledge (Greer and Welch 370). These themes of tragedy, recognit ion 
and blackness overlay Invisible Man’s fall into Harlem: “The train plunged. I dropped through 
the roar, giddy and vacuum-minded, sucked under and out into late afternoon Harlem” (IM 
240). However, the success of Invisible Man’s katabasis/fall here is ambiguous. Allison Greer 
and Dennis Welch argue, “the fortunate aspect of his fall - namely, a degree of self-discovery 
rooted in his own past and his cultural heritage - becomes . . . dubious”; he will go on to trust 
the Brotherhood, and fails to see the fatal “connection between the apple-nibbling woman in 
the subway and any of the women in the Brotherhood” (370). The plurality of Invisible Man’s  
katabases undermine the finality of their tragic knowledge. 
In addition, Ellison uses katabasis to interrogate Enlightenment conceptions of race. In 
seeking to organize the world, Enlightenment thinkers developed essentialist theories of racial 
difference through new scientific disciplines (e.g. phrenology). The classics were claimed as a 
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symbol of white civilization and used to underline oppositions of rational and irrational, order 
and chaos, and white and black. In Ellison’s novel, the Brotherhood seek to change society 
through Enlightenment logic: “It was a world that could be controlled by science, and the 
Brotherhood had both science and history under control” (IM 368). However, the Brotherhood 
are also an underground organization. Their meeting-point is the “Chthonian” Hotel, named 
after the Greek word for underworld (IM 288; Millichap 202). Invisible Man enters through a 
door marked with a “bronze door-knocker in the shape of a large-eyed owl” (IM 288). The 
“bronze” evokes the statue of the Founder and Greek art, the owl Athena, goddess of wisdom. 
However, there is a strange contrast between these Enlightenment symbols and their 
underworld setting. Ellison again invokes a psychological descent into the unconscious as 
Invisible Man feels “an uncanny sense of similarity . . . that [he] had been through it all before” 
(288). The opposition between progress and regress breaks down as Invisible Man admits in 
the lift, “I was uncertain whether we had gone up or down” (288). Ellison’s confusion of the 
tropes of anabasis and katabasis critiques the Brotherhood’s appropriation of order and reason. 
Indeed, its Enlightenment rationalizing – “our scientific approach” (398) – ironically collapses 
into Dionysiac frenzy: “‘Sacrifice, sacrifice, SACRIFICE!’” (457). Ellison suggests that 
essentialist theories of race claim a rational basis in order to justify irrational violence against 
black people. 
Ellison’s katabases also allude to Virgil’s Aeneid. Charles Scruggs reads Invisib le 
Man’s encounter with Sybil as a parody of Aeneid 6, where Aeneas is guided through the 
underworld by the Cumaean Sybil (369). Aeneas meets his father Anchises, who shows him 
the future leaders of Rome; in his hole Invisible Man realizes the meaning of his grandfathe r’s 
last words – to affirm the “principle” of American democracy despite its historical misuse (IM 
560; Scruggs 371; Virgil, Aeneid 6.679-901). Whereas Aeneas’s katabasis falls midway 
through the Aeneid and prepares him for the war in Latium in its second half, Invisible Man’s 
Baxter 21 
 
story ends at the point of his leaving the underground (Scruggs 372). This adds an ambivalence 
to the novel’s ending: we are unsure to what extent Invisible Man successfully leaves the 
underworld to forge a new national identity. The Aeneid frames Rome as teleologically and 
cosmically ordained (although the poem contains deviant and dissenting voices to which critics 
give varying amounts of weight. See Hardie 1-2; Quint 8-9). Invisible Man, however, is 
conscious that society is constructed, not essential: “the mind that has conceived a plan of living 
must never lose sight of the chaos against which that pattern was conceived” (IM 560). Indeed, 
Invisible Man resists being read as another Aeneas: it is during his time with the Brotherhood 
that he desires to “pattern [his] life on that of the Founder” (299), and he later rejects this 
strategy of achieving authority by imitating his heroes. 
Both classical and modernist texts use katabasis as a metapoetic trope for confronting 
one’s literary predecessors (Pike ix, 19-21, Thurston 2). Similarly, when Invisible Man meets 
Brother Jack at the Chthonian, the latter claims, “[A]ll the old heroes are being called back to 
life” (IM 295). However, instead of meeting his heroes, Invisible Man is told that he himse lf 
can become the new, “resurrected” Booker T. Washington by assuming a leadership role (295). 
This parody of katabasis highlights an important problem, namely that a model of heroism 
dependent on the transfer of authority threatens the individuality of the heroes in question. 
Heroism and leadership therefore conflict with individual subjectivity. This is a serious problem 
for the African American leaders, who must be both outstanding individuals and representative 
of the group. In addition, Brother Jack’s injunction that Invisible Man “put aside [his] past” and 
cut off contact with his family (297) suggests an Oedipal struggle for self-identificat ion;  
Invisible Man will finally reject Jack’s authority as the “great white father” (454). Ellison’s use 
of katabasis to link literary and paternal authority recalls Harold Bloom’s study The Anxiety of 
Influence. Bloom argues for a Freudian dynamic to the literary canon, where texts struggle to 
extricate themselves from the authority and influence of their predecessors (8-10). It is worth 
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noting that this reading of the underworld as an encounter with literary forefathers contradicts 
Rankine, for whom katabasis represents the “creative chaos of blackness” and a retreat from 
the Western canon (“Classical Reception and Nothingness” 474). I suggest that Ellison’s text 
supports both readings, destabilizing these distinctions of order and chaos even as it sets them 
up. 
Indeed,  Invisible Man finds a more positive father figure in Brother Tarp’s portrait of 
Douglass. Facing the portrait, he “feel[s] a sudden piety, remembering and refusing to hear the 
echoes of my grandfather’s voice” (IM 365). The portrait links Douglass (in a suggestive artistic 
frame) to the grandfather whose dying words haunt Invisible Man. The noun “piety” is 
suggestive to a classical reader, recalling Aeneas’ quality of pietas (generally translated as 
“piety,” but meaning more broadly memory of one’s obligations to family, religion and the 
state). Invisible Man wonders, “What had his true name been? Whatever it was, it was as 
Douglass that he became himself, defined himself” (367). Although Invisible Man at this time 
identifies more with Douglass’ rags-to-riches journey, Douglass provides an alternative model 
of identity as well. Douglass’s name takes on meaning through the actions of his life – it is the 
creative “transformations” of his name which define him rather than its content (367). Douglass  
finds self-identification through language, as an “orator” (367), and leads through this act of 
autobiography.  
Ellison’s use of the Aeneid can also be seen in Invisible Man’s encounter with Sibyl, 
which changes his ideas of heroism, identity and gender. Having realized the Brotherhood is 
exploiting him, Invisible Man decides to go to the Chthonian and seduce one of the leaders’ 
wives for information. However, Sybil’s husband has no useful knowledge and she herself 
“utters only drunken babble by way of prophecy” (Millichap 203). Invisible Man descends into 
her world of dreams and rituals, only to find himself objectified by them: “[Sybil kept] casting 
me in fantasies in which I was Brother Taboo-with-whom-all-things-are-possible” (IM 498). 
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She proposes he “join her in very revolting [rape] ritual” (499) and explains she has “such 
thoughts and dreams” because “[m]en have repressed [women] too much” (501), a framework 
which fails to account for the fetishization of black men. However, even though Invisible Man 
fails to obtain information from Sybil, he nonetheless gains a sense of individual responsibil ity: 
“What had I done to her, allowed her to do? . . . My action . . . my responsibility?” (507). Schaub 
suggests that Invisible Man realizes “Sybil is no oracle, source neither of information nor of 
revelation,” and finally sees her humanity and his own responsibility even though she does not 
see him (145).  
Suddenly protective of Sybil, Invisible Man tries to guide her home (ironically reversing 
their roles in the Aeneid). They come across an “ancient- looking building, its windows dark. 
Huge Greek medallions showed in spots of light upon its façade, above a dark labyrinthine 
pattern in the stone, and [Invisible Man] propped her against the stoop with its carved stone 
monster” (IM 510). The juxtaposition of “light” and “dark” links Enlightenment oppositions to 
classical architecture. The labyrinth details echo Daedalus’ carvings on the Sybil’s temple at 
Cumae (Scruggs 370; Virgil, Aeneid 6.9-30) – although Ellison’s Sybil soon escapes her 
classical home. The “monster” carving recalls the Minotaur, conceived through bestiality – 
Sybil, similarly, calls Invisible Man a “brute” (IM 505), and Tessa Roynon reads the building’s 
mock-heroic design as a parody of the fear of miscegenation (93). Moreover, it is striking that 
Sybil herself holds overtones of the monstrous, with her “hair wild” and “right eye desperately 
closed” (IM 510). The “carved stone monster” also parallels other descriptions of women in the 
novel as pieces of art (19, 401). Sybil leads Invisible Man into the Harlem riot where he falls 
into the hole, and  he describes her in dreamlike terms: “I saw her again . . . as in a dream . . . 
[saying] ‘Catch Sybil, Sybil,’ running barefoot and girdleless along the park” (511-12). Whilst 
“barefoot” and “girdleless” evoke classical nymphs, Sybil ironically invites Invisible Man to 
participate in this rape fantasy, while he tries to keep her safe. For both Sybil and Invisible Man 
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are objectified by the myths and dreams of the collective unconscious. Sybil’s fetishization of 
Invisible Man is entangled with her own objectification through myths about white 
womanhood. Invisible Man’s knowledge of his “responsibility” to Sybil emerges as he comes 
to realize this (strikingly contemporary) intersectional framework.  
2.3. Tragedy 
Ellison also engages with Greek tragedy in his examination of identity, responsibility 
and the individual versus the community. He uses this tragic frame in the Prologue. Here 
Invisible Man locates his home in the margins: “The point is I found a home – or a hole in the 
ground, as you will . . . I am in a state of hibernation” (5-6). Although he claims, “A hibernat ion 
is a covert preparation for a more overt action,” he remains passive, waiting for “the moment 
for action [to] presen[t] itself” (13). He justifies his inaction with the claim that “[social] 
[r]esponsibility rests upon recognition” (13). However, at the end of the Prologue, he ironica lly 
suggests his social responsibility would be to kill the white stranger: “Someday that kind of 
foolishness [i.e. mercy] will cause us tragic trouble. All dreamers and sleepwalkers must pay 
the price, and even the invisible victim is responsible for the fate of all. But I shirked that 
responsibility; I became too snarled in the incompatible notions that buzzed within my brain” 
(14). In Chapter 2 Invisible Man wonders, “How could anyone's fate be pleasant? I had always 
thought of it as something painful. No one I knew spoke of it as pleasant -- not even Woodridge, 
who made us read Greek plays” (39-40). Later, he remembers Woodridge’s claim, “‘Our task 
is that of making ourselves individuals. The conscience of the race is the gift of its individua ls 
who see, evaluate, record’” (341). The Woodridge references invite us to read a tragic 
conception of fate as related to the development of individual and communal identity. 
Woodridge’s Joycean idea of “conscience” links to Invisible Man’s tragic sense of social 
responsibility. I suggest that Ellison uses tragedy to suggest not only the unfair scapegoating of 
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African Americans, but also the responsibility to claim one’s identity despite the ambiguity of 
identity itself.   
Firstly, Invisible Man uses tragedy to describe the marginalization of African 
Americans. Norton describes fate as pleasant because his “destiny” is linked to that of Invis ib le 
Man. He explains, “’I mean that upon you depends the outcome of the years I have spent in 
helping your school. That has been my real life’s work . . .my first-hand-organizing of human 
life’” (41-2). The juxtaposition of “first-hand” with the impersonal “organizing of human life” 
shows the ironies of Norton’s position. In trying to control his fate and regain only its “pleasant” 
aspects, he gives up the personal responsibility which could render him an individual. He is 
dependent upon the narrator for his identity – “You are my fate” (41) – although, as Invis ib le 
Man remarks, he does not even know his name (45). Norton suggests that the Founder “had 
tens of thousands of lives dependent upon his ideas and his actions . . . In a way, he had the 
power of a king, or in a sense, of a god” (44-5). Norton implies he can escape human limitat ions 
through his influence over others. 
Invisible Man is forced into the role of tragic scapegoat. Thomas Bertonneau suggests 
that the Founder’s status as a “god” (IM 45) and the statue’s Oedipal combination of recognit ion 
and blinding implies that “Ellison intends the statue of the Founder to represent fate in the form 
of man-made systems, even well-intentioned ones, that subsume the men who made them and 
issue not in liberation but in misery.” This aligns with Joseph’s Millichap’s reading of the 
church service as one which “restores the violated order of ritualized race relations and results 
in the narrator’s expulsion as scapegoat” (195). Indeed, the Founder is also a Laius figure: by 
taking Norton to Trueblood and the Golden Day, Invisible Man exposes the myth of the 
American dream, symbolically kills his Founding Father, and must be punished.  Invisible Man 
is expected to sacrifice himself for the college: Bledsoe uses tragic language when he writes 
that the protagonist “in his fall threatens to upset certain delicate relationships between certain 
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interested individuals and the school” (184). Like Oedipus, Invisible Man accepts that he is 
responsible: “Somehow, I convinced myself, I had violated the code and thus would have to 
submit to punishment” (143-4). However, unlike Oedipus, he submits not out of recognit ion 
but denial: “I knew of no other way of living . . . though I still believed myself innocent, I saw 
that the only alternative to permanently facing the world of Trueblood and the Golden Day was 
to accept the responsibility for what happened” (143). Danielle Allen argues that Ellison uses 
tragedy as purification ritual to criticize American politics. Ellison sees political sacrifice as an 
inevitable part of democratic life, but one which should be acknowledged and reciprocated as 
much as possible (49). The failure to acknowledge the sacrifices of African Americans 
constitute a violation of democratic agreements (49).  
Ellison suggests that such sacrifices serve to disguise the reality of life. Ellison asserts 
that Bledsoe expels Invisible Man “because he had allowed Norton to get a glimpse of the chaos 
of reality and the tragic nature of life” (“An Interview with John O’Brien” 53). The Trueblood 
episode therefore be read in tragic terms. In another interview, Ellison claims there is “a little 
bit of hero in this fellow [Trueblood]” (“An Interview with Arlene Crewdson and Rita 
Thomson” 54). Ellison suggests that Trueblood is a tragic hero: “Trueblood involved himse lf 
in incest, which is always a tragic action,” and tried to be responsible about it, and it is for the 
reader to decide “the quality of [his] action” (54). Trueblood presents his narrative in tragic 
terms. His fight with Kate uses the language of pollution: he tells her to “spill no blood” and 
she replies, “You done fouled!” (IM 62). At first, Trueblood decides (like Invisible Man) to 
“take the punishment,” even though he maintains he “ain’t guilty” (62). However, when Kate 
attacks him Trueblood instinctively moves aside. Later he starts to meditate on “how I’m guilty 
and I ain’t guilty” (65). He suggests that, like Oedipus, his guilt is ambiguous because he did 
not knowingly commit incest. Nevertheless, Trueblood decides to take responsibility for his 
actions: “I makes up my mind that I ain’t nobody but myself and ain’t nothing I can do but let 
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whatever is gonna happen, happen. I made up my mind that I was goin’ back home and face 
Kate; yeah, and face Matty Lou too” (65). Trueblood’s agency and guilt is ambiguous, but he 
takes responsibility for his situation anyway. The comic as well as tragic absurdity of this 
situation is shown as Trueblood sings the blues, which Ellison identifies with the “tragicomic 
attitude towards the universe” that is a component of blackness (“The World and the Jug” 177). 
Trueblood realizes his personal identity in combination with this tragi-comic view of his 
relations to others.  
Trueblood’s narrative is also comic in its critique of Norton’s worldview, which is built 
on oppositions of race and gender. Norton tells Invisible Man he helped to build the college as 
a monument to his daughter, who was “more perfect and more delicate than the wildest dream” 
(IM 42). His language evokes the idealization of women, the mythic subconscious and the 
American dream. However, Norton’s description of his daughter as “too pure” (43) threatens 
to collapse this idealized national, racial and sexual purity into the taboo of incest. Indeed, 
Norton “found it difficult to believe her [his] own” (42) and she died in mysterious 
circumstances which still cause him guilt (43). Trueblood’s narrative draws parallels between 
his situation and Norton’s. His reference to Matty Lou as “the gal” recalls Norton’s introduction 
of “[a] girl, my daughter” (42). Trueblood’s hearing Matty Lou say “Daddy” reminds him of 
one of his past lovers doing the same, so he “knowed she must have been dreamin’ ’bout 
somebody from the way she said it and I gits mad wonderin’ if its that boy” (56). The ambiguity 
of “Daddy” portrays women’s sexuality in Freudian terms, whilst Trueblood’s shift in thought 
from his lover to his daughter likewise suggests that his paternal protectiveness has an 
incestuous quality. Trueblood then dreams of a white woman, from whom he “tries to git away” 
(57) – it is implied that this avoidance of miscegenation ironically leads to his committ ing 
incest. Norton is shocked that Trueblood “ha[s] looked upon chaos and [is] not destroyed” (51); 
unlike Oedipus, he feels “no need to cast out the offending eye” (51). His ability to commit 
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incest without self-blinding and scapegoating is a source of “envy and indignation” for Norton 
(51). Whilst Trueblood is shunned by the black community, his narrative is framed by 
references to his white audiences who, “[give him] more help than they ever give any other 
colored man, no matter how good a n***** he was” (67). This echoes Invisible Man’s feeling, 
“I should have been sulky and mean, and that really would have been what [the white folks] 
wanted, even through they were fooled and thought they wanted me to act as I did” (17). 
Trueblood’s subtext suggests that his white listeners paradoxically enjoy his narrative and 
depend upon it for their own self-definition.  
However, the mockery of his double-voiced narrative is lost on Invisible Man.  Like 
Invisible Man, Trueblood is both protagonist and narrator of his story. He crafts a narrative of 
self-identification – “I ain’t nobody but myself” (65) – which sabotages his white listeners from 
within racial stereotypes. Trueblood’s narrative undermines Norton by showing their 
similarities. However, insofar as Trueblood resists Norton through subversive imitation, his 
resistance always risks misrecognition. In framing women as objects of the sexual gaze 
(Awkward, Inspiriting Influences 83-4), Trueblood’s narrative repeats the objectification of 
Norton’s daughter on which its “dream” is founded. Insofar as Trueblood’s narrative is 
repetitive, doubled and open to misrecognition, it has a tragic, incestuous quality.  
Other male characters in the novel link fate to power whilst advocating individual self-
creation. When talking to Norton about fate, Invisible Man “thinks of the first person who’d 
mentioned anything like fate in [his] presence, [his] grandfather” (IM 40). The grandfather 
claims, “’Our life is a war and I have been a traitor all my born days”; his invocation, “’Learn 
it to the younguns,’” suggest that their destiny will be to participate in this war as well. On the 
bus North, the veteran doctor tells Invisible Man, “Play the game, but don’t believe in it” (149). 
He says “they” won’t recognize his trickery. When Crenshaw asks who “they” are, he responds, 
“Why, the same they we always mean, the white folks, authority, the gods, fate, circumstances 
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– the force that pulls your strings until you refuse to be pulled any more” (150). Before he leaves 
the bus, he advises Invisible Man, “Be your own father” (152). Like the grandfather and 
Bledsoe, the veteran advocates strategic double consciousness and trickery as the way to 
navigate the world. The veteran’s speech is striking for its association of tragedy with individua l 
helplessness: the tragic framework of “the gods” and “fate” persists as long as Invisible Man 
allows others to control him. However, his injunction to memory and gift of “fatherly advice” 
clashes with the Oedipal overtones of his speech. Indeed, Mark Conner notes that it is ironica lly 
the father-figures of the novel who advise Invisible Man to “assume creation to himself and 
isolate himself from all others” (180). This ironic pattern implies the limits of maintaining one’s 
inner agency hidden from the external world. Indeed, the veteran’s strategy is misrecognized 
by both Crenshaw (“you’re a nut” [IM 151]) and Invisible Man, who dismisses the veteran as a 
“comical figure” (152).  
Similarly, Rinehart shows the limits of double consciousness at its most extreme. 
Invisible Man takes on a father role when disguised as Rineheart: he is frequently addressed as 
“daddy” and “pops.” However, Rinehart is a figure of total chaos (with Ovidian influences: his 
middle name is “Proteus”). Both his internal and external identities (“rind and heart”) are in a 
state of flux. Invisible Man describes his discovery of the contingency of identity in Oedipal 
terms: “[his day] could not have been more shattering even if I had learned that the man I’d 
always called father was actually of no relation to me” (491). However, this model of “no 
relation[s]” is unhelpful to Invisible Man, who ends up supporting the Brotherhood nonetheless : 
“By pretending to agree I had indeed agreed” (534). Ellison suggests the tragic irony of double 
consciousness, which is inevitably complicit in that which it denies (Lyne 328).  
Invisible Man’s encounter with the blues singer provides another model of tragic 
identity. The song prompts him to make a mental journey home, remembering “far back to 
things I had long ago shut out of my mind” (IM 166).  He considers its meaning: “Was it about 
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a woman or about some strange sphinx- like animal? . . . And why describe anyone in such 
contradictory words? Was it a sphinx?” (170). Invisible Man’s reference to the sphinx evokes 
Oedipus, who famously solved its riddle. However, Ellison adds a gendered twist: whereas in 
the Greek myth the answer to the riddle is “man” (Apollodorus 3.5.8), Invisible Man is unable 
to recognize a woman described with “contradictory words” except as a sphinx, with its 
connotations of myth, otherness and monstrosity. Furthermore, Invisible Man’s repression of 
his past and his attempts to “travel far” and “be detached” evoke Oedipal denial. Invisible Man’s 
odyssey (“long road back”) is thus also an Oedipal denial of another “home” (IM 166). In 
addition, the “contradictory words” describing the woman recall the “incompatible notions that 
buzzed within [his] brain” in the Prologue (14). This suggests that Invisible Man’s ability to 
find his home in the world will be linked to his understanding of the differences within and 
between himself and others.  
In the Epilogue, Invisible Man continues to locate these issues of identity and 
responsibility within a tragic framework. Invisible Man locates his personal identity in terms of 
his relation to others: “the world is just . . . as before, only now I better understand my relation 
to the world and it to me” (556). Insofar as Invisible Man recognizes what was already there, 
his knowledge forms a kind of tragic anagnorisis. Invisible Man acknowledges the contingency 
of identity, but chooses the “imagination” of “possibilities” over the “chaos” and nihilism of 
Rinehart (556). In particular, he commits to the principle of difference: “Now I know that men 
are different and all life is divided and only in division is there true health” (556). He links this 
commitment to difference to the American project: “Our fate is to be one and yet many –   that 
is not prophecy, but description” (557) Invisible Man’s tragic language (“fate,” “prophecy”) is 
striking here, as he creates an Oedipal play of similarity and difference. His worldview is 
comically as well as tragically absurd: “one of the greatest jokes in the world is the spectacle 
of the whites busy escaping blackness and becoming blacker every day, and the blacks striving 
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towards whiteness and becoming quite dull and grey” (557). Invisible Man’s vision of familia l 
interconnectedness is reminiscent of the veteran who claims he is descended from Jefferson – 
on the “‘field-n*****’ side” (76). Invisible Man’s knowledge is tragic insofar as he recognizes 
that which already existed: the interconnectedness of different people and different cultures. At 
the end of the novel, Invisible Man decides to leave his hole, “since there’s a possibility that 
even an invisible man has a socially responsible role to play” (561). The theatrical language 
suggests the limits of social identity, which must inevitably fail to recognize the different facets 
of each human being. Invisible Man may be just a “disembodied voice” (561), unable to meet 
the reader in embodied social interactions (as the dual naming of novel and protagonist 
suggests). Nevertheless, despite being invisible, despite not knowing the limits of his agency, 
Invisible Man decides to embrace his personal responsibility to others. 
Invisible Man’s narrative repeatedly deploys and confuses the tropes of anabasis and 
katabasis, leaving and returning home, recognition and tragic fall. As a result it becomes 
difficult to read the narrator’s final journey underground and promised return upwards as 
confidently predicting his success. Invisible Man’s journey of self-determination and nostos is 
thus also potentially an Oedipal homecoming. His identity is both internal and external, native 
and foreign, homecomer and exile; nevertheless, Ellison insists that this play of unity and 
difference, whilst particular to African American identity, is also part of the human condition. 
As such he detaches humanity from universality to argue for the individuality of African 
Americans as well as their collective rights. There is something tragic about this model of 
identity. To some extent, humans are doomed to misrecognize the complexities of both others 
and themselves. Nevertheless, Invisible Man argues that “humanity is won by continuing to 
play in face of certain defeat” (557). Insofar as Ellison’s novel acknowledges the spectre of the 
past and the interconnectedness of American ethnic groups, it moves away from Oedipal denial 
and encourages a fuller, through still tragi-comic, understanding of “home.” 
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However, Invisible Man’s ambivalent assertion of identity has led to criticism of the 
novel as overly emphasizing the white gaze, not least by Toni Morrison. The novel ends with a 
question – “Who knows but that, on the lower frequencies, I speak for you?” (560) – using call-
and response to encourage the participation of the reader in creating meaning. In moving from 
“I” (3), the first word of the novel, to “you,” Invisible Man suggests that his particular 
experience paradoxically allows him to represent the universal. However, the verb “speak for” 
questions the limits of Invisible Man’s narration. Is this speaking simply the inner voice of the 
text being read by the reader, on whose recognition Invisible Man is dependent for existence  
(“Who knows”)? Or does it mean to speak representing the reader, on their behalf? The twist 
of the latter reading depends on the “you” being a white reader, or a black reader who is 
ambivalent about identifying as such, like Invisible Man in Chapter 1. Morrison supports this 
interpretation in two of her interviews. Whilst she praises Invisible Man, she reads the novel as 
responding to the white gaze: “I didn’t feel they [Ralph Ellison and Richard Wright, author of 
Native Son] were telling me something. I thought they were saying something about us to you, 
to others, to white people” (Taylor-Guthrie 96). She suggests the very metaphor of invisibi lity 
infers a white reader: “invisible to whom? Not me. They are confronting the enemy; the enemy 
is a white guy, or the white establishment or something” (Denard 235). Indeed, Morrison’s first 
novel, The Bluest Eye, responds to Ellison, critically rewriting the Trueblood episode with the 
abused child centre stage (Awkward, Inspiriting Influences 81-88; Duvall 241). However, it 
should be noted that Ellison himself critiques Wright for attributing too much power to the 
white gaze (“The World and the Jug” 162). Invisible Man reflects on the limits of self-
identification as part of its commitment to difference, which also encourages critical 
(re)readings such as Morrison’s. Ellison’s argument for unity-in-diversity both challenges the 
segregationist context in which he grew up (Invisible Man was published two years before 
Brown vs. Board of Education) and anticipates the problems of integration. Morrison is writing 
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during the Black Arts Movement, with its own issues of identity and race. My next chapter 
examines Morrison’s attempt in Song of Solomon to “liberate [herself] as a writer from these 
racial codes” (Denard 59), and her use of the classics in order to do so. 
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3. Toni Morrison’s Song of Solomon 
3.1 The Uses of Tradition 
In her 1988 essay “Unspeakable Things Unspoken,” Morrison uses the classical 
tradition to discuss and deconstruct the Western literary canon. Morrison critiques the claim 
that Western culture is superior because it presents universal human values. She writes, “A 
large part of the satisfaction I have always received from reading Greek tragedy, for example, 
is its similarity to Afro-American communal structures (the function of song and chorus, the 
heroic struggle between the claims of community and individual hubris) and African religion 
and philosophy” (125). Morrison focuses on cultural “similarity,” or sympathy, rather than 
origins or essence. Her invocation of both African American and African cultures further 
destabilizes the idea of direct cultural inheritance or correspondence. Morrison’s enjoyment of 
Greek tragedy is shaped by her aesthetic and cultural concerns (she “feel[s] intellectually at 
home there” [125]). But that heritage does not define the value of Greek tragedy – as she asserts, 
others can enjoy it without recourse to her “home.” She insists that it is the literary form of 
Greek tragedy which makes it valuable, rather than “the civilization which is its referent.” This 
is because the form “makes available these varieties of provocative love.” Tragedy allows for 
the play of difference (“varieties”), both within its structure (the dialectic of chorus and 
protagonist) and in its reception, since it is adaptable to different cultures.  
Whilst Morrison insists of the diversity of classical receptions, she also connects Greek 
culture directly to African culture, bypassing white writers. Such a move is characteristic of 
Afrocentric classicism. Morrison refers to Bernal’s Black Athena, which posits Greece as 
primarily influenced by Egyptian and Asian rather than European cultures. Afrocentric critics 
have used Bernal to claim classical civilization as cultural property stolen from Africa by white 
Europeans (e.g. George G.M. James in his Stolen Legacy). This makes African culture primary 
and superior to the West, not the reverse (I use the terms “Africa” and “African culture” not to 
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suggest that these are monolithic, but because their unity is important to the Afrocentr ic 
argument). Given the history of the classics in the colonization of Africa, the enslavement of 
African Americans, and the sidelining of African American literature and culture, such readings 
of Bernal are understandable. However, they raise problems for those writers who insist on the 
influence of African Americans on the classical and American traditions.  This model of 
Afrocentric classicism also relies on notions of cultural purity insofar as it claims Greece as 
African rather than European. Indeed, Bernal actually argues for Greece as marked by cultura l 
diversity and Morrison acknowledges this, suggesting that Bernal proposes a model of Greek 
culture as “absorbed by Egyptian and Semitic cultures” (130).   
However, whilst Morrison finds Bernal’s “weight of documentary evidence” persuasive, 
she is less interested in proving cultural origins than examining the construction of the tradition 
as deriving from white European origins. She writes, “What struck me in his analysis was the 
process of the fabrication of Ancient Greece and the motives for the fabrication” (131). 
Morrison refers to the processes of canon building whereby Greek culture became the central 
subject of academic study rather than Egyptian. Before this it had been theology (and Latin); 
afterwards, English literature (127, 130). Morrison highlights these canon shifts to destabilize 
the contemporary canon of Western literature. In the canon shift from Egypt to Greece, “Greece 
lost its own origins and became original” (130). Morrison contests the idea of origins by 
showing them as an ideological component of an evolving tradition. The discourse of origins 
in Western literature appeals to Greece for its own timelessness and universality, but it is 
paradoxically only able to do this by erasing Greek origins. Morrison insists that tradition is 
constructed in the present; it is politically and historically specific in its aims. Canon formation 
can be interrogated through an exposure of the processes of fabrication – “misreading” and 
“silence” – and its motives – “the concepts of purity and progress” (131). One can do this 
through readings which reveal how “informing and determining Afro-American presence in 
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traditional American literature” (145; Morrison offers her own reading of Moby-Dick). Such 
readings look for the writerly or readerly strategies taken to address or deny [such a presence]” 
(145). Another strategy is writing, like her own, which affirms African American vernacular 
language and cultural tradition. 
Morrison’s emphasis on the literary tradition rather than origins or direct cultura l 
heritage is particularly important for American classicism. It seems significant that Morrison 
references both African and African American cultures in her discussion of Greek tragedy. For, 
as Kevin Wetmore suggests, the relation of African to Greek culture is an issue “primari ly 
rooted in America, far more than Greece or Africa. In fact, it is in America where the 
relationship between ancient Greece and ancient Africa is explored, debated, and fought over 
the most” (3). Morrison’s focus on cultural sympathy rather than origins undermines ideas of 
cultural purity, or the privileging of one culture over another. As she writes, “A work does not 
get better because it is responsive to another culture; nor does it become automatically flawed  
because of that responsiveness. The point is to clarify, not to enlist” (“Unspeakable Things 
Unspoken” 145).  
Morrison’s interviews foreground a conception of the past which underlies her writing 
on literary traditions. The past according to Morrison should be acknowledged and worked 
through: “I think what I want is not to reinvent the past as idyllic or to have the past as just a 
terrible palm or fist that pounds everybody to death, but to have happiness or growth represented 
in the way in which people deal with their past . . . But denying it, avoiding it, and evading it is 
a sure way to have a truncated life, a life that has no possibilities” (Denard 128-9). However, a 
stale repetition of the past, identifying oneself with unchanging origins, is also a problem. In 
Paradise, the citizens of Ruby are preoccupied with the founding myth of their town. As such 
they “have nothing to pass on. And that is when you freeze history, and you simply pass it off 
as preformed, already made, already understood, already furnished” (Denard 164). Morrison 
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suggests that it is in the nature of a healthy tradition to change in the process of its being passed 
on. This applies to myths as well: “We don't live in places where we can hear those stories 
anymore; parents don't sit around and tell their children those classical, mythological archetypal 
stories that we heard years ago. But new information has got to get out, and there are several 
ways to do it. One is the novel” (“Rootedness: The Ancestor as Foundation” 340). Morrison 
commits herself to myths, whilst also creating room for potential critiques and “new 
information” (Awkward, “Unruly and Let Loose” 487). As such Morrison insists on the present-
ness of the past, “that notion of its always being now, even though it is past . . . because the past 
is never something you have to record, or go back to” (Denard 130). On the one hand, Morrison 
presents tradition as shaped by historical and political forces, which often present it as frozen 
and pure (as in Paradise). On the other, because it is in the nature of tradition to change, and 
the past is realized in the present, traditions hold subversive potential as well. Morrison’s dual 
approach to tradition extends to her treatment of the classics: her novels show her double 
“perception both of the classical tradition’s hallowed position within hegemonic culture, its role 
as a ‘pillar of the establishment’, and of that tradition’s simultaneous subversive potential” 
(Roynon 3). Morrison’s strategic ambivalence works to undermine the polarizations which 
trouble African American classicists: she neither denies the historical role of the classics in 
reinforcing cultural hegemony nor accepts its construction as white property.  
3.2. Epic: Monomyth, Katabasis and Heroism 
Like Invisible Man, Song of Solomon is frequently read as an archetypal heroic narrative. 
Leslie Harris argues that Morrison uses the narrative of the hero and his quest to structure her 
novel. Similarly, Dorothy Lee reads Song of Solomon as presenting Milkman’s initiation into 
heroic masculinity. Significantly, both critics stress the universality of Milkman’s journey: his 
quest is “common to mythic heroes as disparate as Moses, Achilles and Beowulf” (Harris 70) 
and follows the “universal monomyth of the life journey” (Lee 65). There is some grounding 
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for these readings. Milkman conforms to many of the patterns of the Rankian mythic hero. He 
is the son of distinguished parents; there are difficulties around his conception; he survives 
attempted abortions; he discovers his ancestry, takes revenge on his father, achieves status 
within his community, and so on (Brenner 13-14). Morrison herself in her foreword to the 2005 
edition of Song of Solomon describes her interest to depicting a “very saga-like” journey. She 
describes the novel as “[o]ld-school heroic, but with other meanings” (xii). Whilst later 
scholarship has examined these “other meanings” in more detail, archetypal-heroic readings are 
still a popular approach to the novel (Furman 5; Ramirez Lopez; Rankine 106-7). It is worth 
noting that these archetypal readings frequently privilege Morrison’s classical sources. Lee uses 
the presence of Circe to argue that Milkman “undergoes archetypal trials” (68); Harris compares 
Milkman to Aeneas and Ulysses and argues that the opening of the novel “consciously evokes 
the classical myth of Icarus” (74-5). It is also characteristic of these readings to see Milkman’s 
initiation into heroism as complete by the novel, and his final flight as a symbol of closure. 
Song of Solomon also lends itself to Homeric readings. Rankine argues that, “[o]utside 
Ellison’s writings, the Ulysses theme in African American literature is most profound in Toni 
Morrison’s Song of Solomon” (Ulysses in Black 103). Milkman leaves home in search of gold 
and glory; he returns with a greater understanding of himself and others. Harris asserts that the 
novel shares classical epic’s concern with its mythic past: “Like Aeneas, like Ulysses, Milkman 
needs to look into his family’s and his people’s past before he can move into the future” (74). 
However, Morrison’s novel resists being read as a master narrative modelled on linear classical 
epic. Her use of katabasis and burial points to the divergent moments of Homer, where 
Odysseus must move forward by going back, and remember the past and his obligations to 
others. Indeed, Pilate is killed in the act of burying her father’s bones; with Milkman himself a 
potential “ghost” (SoS 363), the question of burial remains open at the end of the novel.  
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Milkman’s journey into the cave has been read as a katabasis by several critics (Fletcher 
405; Harris 74). It is most obviously signaled as such by the presence of the character Circe, 
who directs Milkman to the cave. Judith Fletcher suggests that Circe helps Milkman enact a 
katabasis which is also a ritual of renewal – he is, after all, surnamed “Dead” (414). Lee 
suggests he reaches the cave in a series of symbolic, “archetypal trials” as he climbs over a stile, 
crosses a river, and so on. However, instead of descending into the “pit” (SoS 274), Milkman 
has to “climb” to the “black hole in the rock” (273); as Fletcher notes, Morrison’s use of ascent 
rather than descent subverts our expectations (414). Whilst Homer’s Odysseus consults the dead 
for information on how to get home, Milkman hopes to find the gold which will allow him to 
leave home with impunity. Odysseus discovers his companion Elpenor has been left unbur ied; 
Milkman only pretends to be seeking his grandfather’s bones for burial (SoS 270). Morrison’s 
cave is both a palimpsest- like space, with traces of old sleeping-places, fires and an old tin cup 
(273-4) and, for the expectant Milkman, a void: “There were no fat pigeon-breasted bags of 
gold. There was nothing. Nothing at all” (274). The nonlinear temporality of the cave is also 
suggested by the breaking of Milkman’s watch on his approach (Fletcher 406; SoS 271). The 
strange relation of the cave to time marks it as a symbolic underworld space whilst also 
challenging a linear heroic narrative. Indeed, the emptiness of the cave suggests Morrison’s 
skepticism towards katabasis as a metapoetic encounter with canonical writers. 
Rather Morrison locates katabatic themes of fatherhood, death and burial within a 
communal and nonlinear narrative structure. The story of the cave is narrated by mult ip le 
characters, out of linear order, through both direct and free indirect discourse. Macon narrates 
his murder of the white man to Milkman in Chapter 7; Circe tells Milkman that Jake’s body 
was placed in the cave in Chapter 10 (266). In Chapter 5, Pilate tells Ruth that she saw her 
father’s ghost telling her, “You can’t just fly off and leave a body” (163); in Chapter 9, she tells 
Macon that she returned to the cave to collect the white man’s bones (228). Milkman fina lly 
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tells Pilate that her sack contains her father’s bones in Chapter 15. The story also involves 
multiple encounters by different characters with different kinds of father figures. Marianne 
Hirsch reads Macon’s indiscriminate murder of the “white patriarch” as reminiscent of Oedipus 
killing Laius (83). Macon Sr.’s ghost leads his children into the cave, speaks to them when they 
find the gold and prompts Pilate to return (SoS 163). Macon Sr. also marks the cave through his 
physical remains, placed there by the Butlers, collected by Pilate and eventually buried by Pilate 
and Milkman. Milkman himself visits the cave on the wishes of his father, who thinks the gold 
is still there.  
The multiple narrators, flashbacks and retellings of the story locate Milkman’s 
adventure within the oral tradition and disrupt a linear master narrative focused on a single 
protagonist. This makes an interesting contrast to Ellison. Whereas Ellison’s signifying on 
katabasis reads more as jazz-like variations on a theme, Morrison constructs her katabatic 
narrative out of her characters’ different voices and experiences. Indeed, not only Milkman’s 
but also Macon Sr.’s and Pilate’s relation to the cave can be read in epic terms. Pilate stands 
vigil in the cave and emerges with new self-sufficiency. She departs on her own journey, 
including a relationship with an “island man” reminiscent of Calypso (163). Her brother 
emerges with a fear of becoming an Odysseus figure, “the outsider, the propertyless, landless 
wanderer” (34). Morrison multiplies her odysseys, undermining Milkman’s linear, 
individualistic drive to “win” through heroic adventure (273). Indeed, epic/archetypal readings 
of the novel fail to emphasize that Milkman returns to Virginia at the end of the novel, rather 
than making a single, linear odyssey.  
Circe herself is an ambivalent figure. Fletcher finds several allusions to Homer’s Circe  
(407): the smoke which rises from her house (SoS 183), her Weimeraners with human eyes 
(261), her ability to sexually arouse Milkman (261) and her role as informant and guide (265-
7). The animals on Lincoln’s farm, who have human names (including Ulysses S. Grant), also 
Baxter 41 
 
recall Circe’s victims in the Odyssey (SoS 61). Circe is both a relic of the epic tradition and a 
transformative character who destabilizes the boundary between life and death. Reverend 
Cooper claims she was more than a hundred years old when she died, fifty years ago (254). 
Circe’s age can be read as a tongue-in-cheek reference to her ancient mythic status. When 
Milkman meets her he is confused: “Perhaps this woman is Circe. But Circe is dead. This 
woman is alive . . . She had to be dead . . . Because out of the toothless mouth came the strong, 
mellifluent voice of a twenty-year-old girl” (262). Circe’s contradictions – she is alive and dead, 
terrifying and alluring – suggest Morrison’s reworking of the misogynist figure of the “witch” 
(260). Linda Krumbolz argues that Circe’s liminality reflects the life-giving communion with 
the dead which characterizes some African rituals. She therefore links ancestor communion to 
reader response: “the solution of whether Circe is alive or dead is less important than a 
reassessment of the certainty with which we define and divide the living and the dead” (569). 
Krumbolz suggests that Circe functions, like Milkman at the end of the novel, as “our textual 
ancestor to carry within us, to stimulate our imaginations” (569).  
Milkman’s confusion over Circe’s identity also highlights Morrison’s engagement with 
classical epic. The encounter is marked by misrecognition, both by Milkman and Circe herself: 
“‘Where is he? My Macon?”” (SoS 262). Just as Milkman shares his father’s name but is distinct 
from him, so Morrison opens up a gap between Circe and her name: “’Yes; Circe . . . My name 
is Circe” (262). The fragmented syntax splits Circe the character from her Homeric name. This 
has a similar effect to the classical names of Derek Walcott’s Omeros, whereby “readers are 
constantly reminded not to project Homeric expectations onto the character’s lives through a 
narrative strategy of misrecognition” (Greenwood 585). Circe both is and is not her Homeric 
counterpart, and this ambiguity destabilizes readings of Song of Solomon in terms of a one-to-
one correspondence with the Odyssey. Indeed, Circe is mentioned at several points by differe nt 
characters before she appears, creating a cycle of stories and personal myths within the novel’s 
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structure and contesting the fixity of her classical representation. Furthermore, even if we read 
her encounter with Milkman as a nod to Odysseus’ misrecognition on his arrival in Ithaca, 
Circe’s relationship with Homer becomes more, not less, complicated (Circe is misrecognized 
as her Homeric counterpart in Homeric terms?). Indeed, Morrison also uses Homeric 
misrecognition to subvert Milkman’s pretensions in Shalimar: “here, in his ‘home,’ he was 
unknown, unloved, and damn near killed” (SoS 292). Whereas Odysseus is denied hospitality 
in his own kingdom, Morrison depicts Milkman’s expectation of a hero’s welcome in his 
ancestral home (his “original home”) as a symptom of his entitlement. Morrison’s most obvious 
allusions to the Odyssey thus complicate her novel’s relationship to it, even as they seem to 
signpost an explanation of black culture in classical terms.  
Morrison uses the name Circe not to elevate Milkman’s odyssey through reference to 
classical culture, but to acknowledge it as part of a tradition. Milkman includes Circe as one of 
the “[n]ames that bear witness” (355). He wonders, “How many dead lives and fading memories 
were buried in and beneath the names of the places in this country” (354). The phrase “dead 
lives” evokes both Circe’s textual/ancestral liminality and his own family name. Morrison thus 
uses old names in order to transform them, reviving the hidden histories and experiences of 
black people that shape the American landscape. This is suggestive of what she calls her 
archaeology of the “civilization that has existed under the white civilization” (Taylor-Guthr ie 
12) – a civilization which is nonetheless inextricably linked to the dominant culture. Morrison’s 
use of classical names recalls the Odyssey, where “names possess a transformative power . . . 
Odysseus does indeed become No Man, the name he uses to trick the Cyclops, when he arrives 
home as a nameless beggar” (Fletcher 405; the transformative function of names also evokes 
Ovid’s Metamorphoses, to which I return). However, Morrison invokes not only Greek and 
Roman culture, but their historical applications. Like Barbee’s reference to “black Aristotle, ” 
Morrison’s classical names evoke Southern slavery practices; in a private conversation with 
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Roynon, Morrison said she “took [these names] from the registers of slave ships” (187). The 
historical link between classical naming and slavery is further evoked by Circe’s proximity to 
the Butler mansion. 
However, Morrison does not accept her characters’ classical names as symbolic only of 
oppression. She insists, “Slaves were called Cato. I don’t use that. At least, I use the names that 
black people are willing to accept for themselves” (Denard 112). Indeed, Beloved, Morrison’s 
1987 novel about slavery, is the only one in her oeuvre without classically named characters. 
Morrison frames her interest in black people’s names within African American history and 
culture (Denard 111). Slaves such as Douglass recognized the power of names to define and 
control, and renamed themselves; Malcolm X changed his name to acknowledge his lost 
African name. When Guitar tells Milkman that he is part of the Seven Days, Milkman mocks 
him by comparing him to “that red-headed Negro named X,” asking, “‘Why don’t you join him 
and call yourself Guitar X?’” (SoS 176). Guitar replies that he accepts his surname as part of 
his personal history: “It’s part of who I am. Guitar is my name. Bains is the slave master’s name. 
And I’m all of that” (177). Guitar’s response acknowledges that, whilst naming can be 
oppressive, a “[s]lave name” does not necessarily indicate “slave status” (177). 
Lucinda MacKethan compares Guitar’s response to Ellison’s analysis of names in his 
1964 essay “Hidden Name and Complex Fate” (205). Ellison writes of the Nation of Islam, 
“They would declare new identities, . . . destroy the verbal evidence of a willed and ritualized 
discontinuity of blood and human intercourse” (194). Ellison’s problem with new names is that 
they erase the historical denial of African American identity. Ellison adds, “[O]nly a few [of 
us] seek to deal with our names in this manner. We take what we have and make of them what 
we can” (194). He continues, “Our names, being the gift of others, must be made our own.” 
Both Ellison and Morrison relate names to ideas of fate, tradition, community and identity. It is 
characteristic of names to be given by others – both by the African American community (Not 
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Doctor Street, Milkman) and whites (Macon Dead). However, names also symbolize the 
potential to define one’s own identity, insofar as one chooses how to relate oneself and one’s 
life to the tradition represented by that name. When Pilate is born, the nurse is horrified when 
her father names her after the “Christ-killing” figure in the Bible, who washes his hands of 
responsibility (SoS 25). Macon Senior chooses her name because it looks “protective” (25); 
when he discovers its Biblical referent, he keeps it as a symbol of defiance (26). Pilate herself 
lives as both a traveler and a guide to others, so that her name also comes to mean “Pilot” (25, 
307). As MacKethan asserts, “The name must bear witness to her life, not her life to the name” 
(206). Morrison’s names, classical and otherwise, thus indicate both the determining and 
potentially subversive force of tradition.  
Morrison portrays heroic selfhood as emerging in relation to the community. When 
Milkman contemplates stealing the gold, “[h]e felt a sense of self inside him emerge . . . A self 
that could join in the chorus at Railroad Tommy’s with more than laughter” (SoS 201). Morrison 
suggests that it Milkman’s ability to narrate his heroics to others – “He could tell this” (201) – 
which allows him to form a distinct identity. Milkman bases his sense of self on his ability to 
join the collective “chorus,” in contrast to the model of heroism through individual achievement 
which structures the American Dream (Roynon 137). The chorus is also a positive force lacked 
by Hagar, who “needed what most colored girls needed: a chorus of mama, grandmamas, aunts, 
cousins, sisters, neighbors, Sunday school teachers, best girl friends, and what all to give her 
the strength life demanded of her” (SoS 332; Roynon 141). Morrison links the presence of a 
chorus to the ability to form healthy relationships; without one, Hagar becomes fatally 
dependent on Milkman’s love. However, Morrison does not unreservedly affirm the chorus, 
which can also denote negative groups, from the “chorus” of gang rapists in Love (115) to the 
“choir” of Ruby patriarchs in Paradise (280; Roynon 141). The discussion with the Danville 
men similarly reinforces both Milkman’s desire for the gold and his ego: “He glittered in the 
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light of their adoration and grew fierce with pride” (SoS 257). As Roynon notes, Milkman’s 
pride recalls the hubris of the tragic hero before his downfall (139).  Whilst Morrison shows the 
importance of the community for affirming a distinct sense of self, she also critiques this 
process, insofar as Milkman’s identity forms out of his sense of superiority to others.  
Morrison explores the process of mythologizing heroes when Milkman discusses his 
family with the men in Danville. The men “remembered both Macon Deads as extraordinary 
men . . . [the second Macon Dead] outran, outplowed, outshot, outpicked, outrode them all” 
(SoS 255). On the one hand, Morrison’s language of competitive excellence recalls models of 
classical heroism, whereby the hero proves his individual excellence against a group: so 
Achilles claims for himself the title “best of the Achaeans” (Homer, Iliad 1.91). However, 
Morrison also grounds Macon’s heroics within a group narrative. Macon Junior’s excellence is 
affirmed communally (“they agreed”) and reinforces the men’s sense of self (“their 
contemporary”). Moreover, the men’s remembering of Macon Senior make him an absent 
presence in their lives: “The good times, the hard times, things that changed, things that stayed 
the same – and head and shoulders above all of it was the tall, magnificent Macon Dead, whose 
death . . . was the beginning of their own dying” (SoS 256). Morrison highlights that their 
mythologizing is only possible because Macon is dead; in his absence, he becomes a screen for 
their projections. Indeed, when the men discuss Macon Junior, Milkman “could not recognize 
that stern, greedy, unloving man in the boy they talked about” (255). Morrison ironica lly 
juxtaposes the symbolic father figure represented by the men’s myths, who takes on power in 
his absence, to the reality of Macon’s emotionally distant parenting. 
Morrison thus locates heroic myths within the specific communities and family histories 
of her novel. Morrison frames the men’s American “dream” and myth of individua l 
achievement – [here] is what a man can do if he puts his mind to it” – within a tradition of call-
and-response: the farm “spoke to them like a sermon” (256). Jake uses his property, Lincoln’s 
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Haven, to resist racism and empower his community: “never mind you born a slave . . . If I got 
a home you got one too! Grab this land! . . . buy it, sell it, own it, build it, multiply it, and pass 
it on” (256). However, Morrison also emphasizes the family aspect of the myth, which is 
reinterpreted and passed down by Jake’s son and grandson. The farm’s invocation to “own” the 
land is reminiscent of Macon Junior’s invocation to Milkman: “Own things. And let the things 
you own own other things” (64). Gary Storhoff argues that Macon’s materialism can be read 
not as an opposition to his father’s legacy, but an interpretation of it (292). In the absence of his 
father, the traumatized Macon Junior tries to “re-create the land that was to have been his” (SoS 
61). In mythmaking this promised land, Macon creates a twisted narrative of the farm focused 
on pure materialism (Stohoff 292). Milkman is thus influenced by his father’s interpretation of 
heroism: he focuses on his father’s economic success, “bragg[ing]” about his material “assets” 
(SoS 257). Morrison locates her characters’ aspirations to individual heroism within their 
specific histories and encounters with others, rather than portraying it as a universal ideal.  
3.3. Tragedy 
Morrison also considers heroic individualism in her portrayal of the Seven Days. These 
men reject strategies of racial uplift and integration (Story 155-6), instead creating an African 
American collective in opposition to the dominant culture. Indeed, Milkman’s first encounter 
with Hospital and Railroad Tommy is reminiscent of Invisible Man’s confrontation with the 
veterans at the Golden Day. Ellison’s veterans are traumatized less by their wartime experiences 
than by their return home, where they remain invisible despite their national service. Invis ib le 
Man is susceptible to myths of heroic achievement, racial uplift and white benevolence – “oh, 
those multimillionaires!” (IM 37) – and the veteran doctor at the Golden Day mocks this belief: 
“’The campus, what a destiny!’” (93). Hospital Tommy’s name echoes Ellison’s doctor; he 
addresses Guitar as a university student like Invisible Man: “Have all the halls of academe 
crumbled?” (SoS 67). Similarly, Railroad Tommy (whose name evokes the “railroad crossing” 
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beside the Golden Day [IM 70]) echoes the doctor as he critiques the boys’ sense of entitlement. 
He tells them that, as African Americans, they will achieve neither material riches – “no private 
coach with four red velvet chairs”- nor political power – “no governor’s mansion” –  nor 
recognition for military service – “four stars on your shirt, or even three” (SoS 69). Morrison 
aligns the Seven Days with the nihilism and despair of Ellison’s veterans: the name “Seven 
Days” recalls the “Golden Day,” and Guitar claims that the organization was founded as a result 
of racial hate crimes against veterans by white Americans (171). However, Morrison focuses 
more on identity formation within African American communities. Whilst Invisible Man seeks 
to impress the white trustees, and enters the Golden Day as a last resort, Milkman longs to be 
part of the black group: he and Guitar enter Tommy’s’ barbershop because Feather refuses to 
let Milkman in his bar (66-67). Moreover, the Seven Days do not reject social roles as such but 
attempt to define an African American collective identity in opposition to white Americans. 
Morrison locates Guitar’s worldview within a tragic framework. Guitar does not believe 
in the justice of the law: “If there was anything like or near justice or courts when a cracker 
kills a Negro, there wouldn’t have to be no Seven Days” (176). He portrays the law as 
irrationally motivated against black people, just as whites’ racist violence shows them to be 
“crazy,” “ignorant” and “unnatural” (172). Guitar thus critiques Enlightenment conceptions of 
law and democracy: “They killed us first and then tried to get some scientific proof about why 
we should die” (173). He suggests that apparent rationality of the law is a façade for its irrationa l 
racism. In a persuasive reading, Roynon highlights the correspondences between Guitar’s 
language and Aeschylus’ Oresteia: “Guitar speaks the language of Aeschylus’s Clytemnes tra 
in his articulation of white violence as a contamination that (in the absence of meaningful legal 
process) can only be purged by revenge” (145). Morrison portrays white violence as a pollutant: 
Guitar’s assertion that “the earth is soggy with black people’s blood” (174) recalls the Chorus 
of the Libation Bearers: “What can wash off the blood once spilled on the ground?” (Aeschylus 
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47). In applying to the law the tragic motifs of pollution, irrationality and revenge, Morrison 
suggests that “despite the enlightened aspirations it professes, in the guise of ‘law’ or in the 
name of ‘democracy’ the dominant culture wreaks a vengeance that is as irrational as Pentheus’s 
attempt to deploy force against Dionysus in the Bacchae, and as primitive as the Agamemnon’s 
‘ancient spirit of revenge’” (Roynon 145). Guitar’s language collapses the opposition between 
the irrational Furies and lawful Eumenides which ends the Oresteia, critiquing  the conceptions 
of law and justice on which Enlightened America is built (Roynon 144). 
However, Guitar’s response to racial injustice tragically enmeshes him in the violence 
he seeks to oppose. Having given up on racial equality, Guitar adopts an “oppositionally defined 
identity” (Lubiano 109). His model of justice is an eye for an eye: “the only thing left to do is 
balance [racial violence]; keep things on an even keel . . . I help keep the numbers the same” 
(SoS 170). Roynon suggests that his language recalls both the law courts of the Oresteia and its 
chorus, whose language of balance disguises its irrational desire for revenge (145). Guitar 
himself repeats this claim of rationality when he protests, “I am reasonable” (SoS 174). In his 
assertion that “[t]he disease they have is in their blood, in the structure of their chromosomes” 
(173), Guitar combines the language of Enlightenment science (“chromosomes”) with that of 
tragic pollution (“blood”). Morrison further invokes Nietzchean oppositions of Apolline order 
and Dionysiac chaos by associating Guitar with Apollo. This is shown through his love of 
hunting and his name (suggestive of the lyre); the Seven Days recalls Apollo’s birth on the 
seventh day of the month and his role in bringing the sun to start the day (Lee 66). Nevertheless, 
in juxtaposing rational African Americans and irrational whites, Guitar perpetuates those same 
racist Enlightenment oppositions. Guitar’s unitary view of identity tragically replicates racism, 
as Milkman suggests: “‘You hear what you said? Negroes. Not Milkman. Not ‘No, I can’t touch 
you, Milkman,’ but ‘We don’t off Negroes.’” (Farrell 144; SoS 177). The Seven Days may also 
allude to Ellison’s Brotherhood, who similarly use Enlightenment rationalism to disguise an 
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irrational, Dionysiac drive towards violence; however, Morrison decentres white racism by 
locating these concerns within the relationships of her black characters.  
In contrast to Guitar’s tragically unitary view of identity, Milkman faces an Oedipal 
struggle to separate himself from others. Indeed, Song of Solomon is frequently read in Oedipal 
terms. Eleanor Branch sees Milkman’s narrative as “centred on the resolution of Oedipal issues” 
(70; see also Hirsch 82-84, Mobley 54-7, and Tidey 57-59). Morrison evokes Oedipus most 
obviously through the novel’s incestuous relationships: Ruth’s relationship with her father (SoS 
83) and breastfeeding of Milkman (88), Milkman’s relationship with his cousin Hagar. 
Milkman himself repeats Oedipal dynamics in his overly distant relationship with his father – 
whom he compares to a “stranger” (84) – and symbiotic relationship with his mother: “Never 
had he thought of his mother as a person, a separate individual” (85). Milkman affects a “limp” 
aged fourteen, believing that “one of his legs was shorter than the other” (71). Milkman’s limp 
makes him feel “secretly connected to the later President Roosevelt,” whom he prefers to his 
own father. Macon “had no imperfection and age seemed to strengthen him. Milkman feared 
his father, respected him, but knew, because of the leg, that he could never emulate him. So he 
differed from him as much as he dared” (72). This can be read as a parody of Oedipus – whereas 
Oedipus’ limp is a secret sign of his father’s attempted infanticide, Milkman enjoys a secret 
connection to FDR rather than his own father. Milkman’s Oedipal denial is reduced to his 
hairstyle and clothes, though “he couldn’t help sharing with Macon his love of good shoes and 
fine thin socks” (72).  
Morrison further subverts Oedipal paradigms when Milkman confronts his father. Ruth 
provokes Macon by suggestively identifying herself as her “daddy’s daughter” (76) – 
suggesting the ambiguity of “Daddy” used by Trueblood – and, when Macon hits her, Milkman 
attacks him with the Oedipal threat of murder: “I’ll kill you” (77). Milkman and Macon’s 
contradictory feelings of rivalry and sympathy evoke Oedipus’ anagnorisis: “Just as the father 
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brimmed with contradictory feelings as a crept along the wall – humiliation, anger, and a 
grudging feeling of pride in his son – so the son felt his own contradictions” (77). Morrison’s 
simile is interesting: Milkman’s response to his father’s vulnerability is like the “[s]orrow in 
discovering that the pyramid was not a five-thousand-year wonder of the civilized world, 
mysteriously and permanently constructed by generation after generation of hardy men who 
had died in order to perfect it, but that it had been made in the back room at Sears, by a clever 
window dresser, of papier-mâché, guaranteed to last a mere lifetime” (77). As Marilyn Sanders 
Mobley perceives, “[in]n the process of winning a temporary victory over his father, [Milkman] 
loses his ideal image of him” (54). It is striking that the loss of Macon’s symbolic power is 
described in Egyptian, not Greek terms, connecting ideas of familial and cultural origins and 
contesting the primacy of Greek civilization. The phallic power of the pyramid and its eternal 
cycle of male generations is substituted for the art of the (feminine?) shop attendant; it is also 
revealing that Milkman idealizes the deaths of hardy men who were probably slaves.  
Indeed, Morrison links Oedipal dynamics to systems of oppression. As Lena notes, the 
power which is transferred from father to son is the power to control the female members of the 
family: “You think because you hit him once that we all believe you were protecting her . . . 
It’s a lie. You were taking over, letting us know you had the right to tell her and all of us what 
to do” (SoS 235). Milkman’s Oedipal error is fatalistic only insofar as he repeats his father’s 
abuse: “You are exactly like him” (235). Morrison uses incestuous overtones to critique both 
Macon’s objectification of his daughters – “First he displayed us, then he splayed us” (236) – 
and Milkman’s narcissism: “He had never really been able to distinguish [his sisters] (or their 
roles) from his mother” (78). Lena questions the basis of Milkman’s authority: “Where do you 
get the right to decide our lives?” (235). She reduces the phallus to “that hog’s gut that hangs 
down between your legs” (235). When Corinthians comes back from meeting Henry Porter, she 
hears Milkman and Macon talking about the gold and “wonder[s] if this part of the night . . . 
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had always belonged to men. If perhaps it was a secret hour in which men rose like giants from 
dragon’s teeth” (221). Roynon notes the link to Cadmus’ sowing of the dragon teeth when he 
founds Thebes: “the reference gives heroic stature to the Dead family, and suggests the 
possibility of their undergoing a tragic fate” (153). In particular, Morrison’s allusion highlights 
the myth’s themes of male autochthony, civil war and incest. Morrison genders the Oedipus 
myth to critique its normalization of male power over women within the family, which she 
suggests is itself dysfunctional. Moreover, by connecting the Deads to the House of Cadmus as 
a whole, and applying incestuous relations to multiple characters, Morrison decenters Oedipus 
and examines broader family dynamics of othering and enmeshment. 
Indeed, Song of Solomon transforms Oedipal family relationships. As Storhoff suggests, 
the problem with Freudian readings is that they do not account for family history lasting 
multiple generations or, because of their focus on the unconscious, individual moral agency 
(290). Storhoff argues that Milkman must learn to transcend family patterns of “enmeshment” 
– the process whereby parents attempt to resolve their own childhood problems in the lives of 
their children (290). Milkman is able to assert emotional independence from his parents on 
leaving home; however, he must also release them from his “infantile desire for [his parents’] 
perfection” (Storhoff 300-1). The dual separation allows him to view his parents and their past 
with real empathy. It is significant that Milkman’s limp is not resolved when he strikes his 
father, but after the hunt in Shalimar. In the woods, conscious of his separation from others, 
Milkman becomes aware of his selfishness: “Apparently, he thought he deserved only to be 
loved – from a distance, though – and given what he wanted” (SoS 300). Milkman listens to the 
sounds of the hunt; he perceives them in terms of a pre-symbolic connection between humans 
and nature: “Language in a time when men and animals did talk to one another” (301). This 
sense of connection allows him to escape an assassination attempt by Guitar (302). Finally, 
Milkman is able to integrate into the group of Shalimar men, laughing about his fear just as the 
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men in Tommy’s barbershop do about Emmett Till (93). In feeling his connection to others, his 
body and the earth, Milkman feels “like his legs were stalks” (304). Krumholz notes that this 
moment recalls Macon’s wish for an “ancestor . . . [with] legs as straight as cane stalks, who 
had a name that was real” (Krumholz 557; SoS 24). Krumholz suggests that, whilst Macon 
focuses on the documentary loss of his ancestral name, “Milkman becomes the ‘true’ ancestor” 
of whom his father dreams by “reimagin[ing] himself and generat[ing] his own meaning” (557). 
Milkman paradoxically becomes his father’s own ancestor and displaces the Oedipal struggle 
over origins. In reviving his father’s dream on his own terms, Milkman finds his own identity 
not through Oedipal violence (which is doomed to recur) but healthy re-relation and connection. 
Morrison thus invokes Oedipal relationships only to displace them, rooting Milkman’s identity 
formation within complex intergenerational and cultural relationships. 
3.4. Flight 
These ideas of family, community and identity are shown in Morrison’s treatment of the 
flying trope. As with the motifs of odyssey and katabasis, Morrison multiplies the moments of 
flying in her novel. The flight of Robert Smith recalls that of Icarus: Smith has crafted his own 
“blue silk wings” (SoS 11). However, rather than enacting a secret escape, Smith announces his 
suicide with a public note: “I will take off from Mercy and fly away on my own wings” (9). 
The individualistic overtones of “my own wings” are undermined by Smith’s request for 
forgiveness and his claim, “I loved you all.” The wings therefore become a euphemism for 
suicide (framed as leaving the community) rather than a celebration of escape. Indeed, Smith’s 
declaration of love recalls Guitar – “Everything I do, I do for love” – who indeed tells Milkman 
that suicide is a form of commitment to the Seven Days: “if it ever gets too much, like it was 
for Robert Smith, we do that rather than crack and tell somebody” (175). As such the text 
supports Morrison’s assertion that Smith’s death is a kind of “contract with his people”; he is, 
after all, the “Mutual Life Insurance Agent” (9). Nevertheless, Smith’s flight suggests the 
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problems of an overly communal identity. Since Smith is unable to share his experiences with 
others, flight is his only relief from the pressure of the Seven Days, who demand overwhelming 
commitment to the group.  
Milkman initially perceives the gold as a means to fly away from his responsibilities to 
others. Before looking for the gold, Guitar and Milkman see a “pure white peacock” (196); 
Guitar explains the bird cannot fly because of its tail, a kind of “jewelry” which weighs it down 
“like vanity” (196). He claims, “Wanna fly, you got to give up the shit that weighs you down” 
(196). Guitar mocks the peacock’s materialism, but the men begin to “fantasize about what the 
gold could buy . . . Milkman wanted boats, cars, airplanes, and the command of a large crew” 
(196). Milkman’s desire for wealth and authority recalls his father – ironically, since he dreams 
of flying as an escape from parental enmeshment. Indeed, the peacock also recalls the young 
Macon’s desire for the gold:  “Life, safety and luxury fanned out before him like the tail-spread 
of a peacock”(188). Morrison uses the language of flying to frame Milkman’s rejection of 
serious relationships: “[H]is attempts to ignore [his parents’ relationship], transcend it, seemed 
to work only when he spent his days looking for whatever was light-hearted” (197). This 
rejection  is understandable in the light of Milkman’s experiences with his parents, who refuse 
to see him as a separate person. Nevertheless, it also ironically limits Milkman’s attempts to 
fly: his narcissism is also a form of spiritual “vanity” which “weighs [him] down” (196). 
Morrison’s critique is also gendered: the men laugh at the peacock, which Guitar calls a “White 
faggot” (196), but the scene reveals their own projections – Milkman’s narcissism, Guitar’s 
racial and homophobic othering, and their mutual concern with being accepted by the male 
group. 
The legend of Solomon is another variation on the flying trope. Morrison locates 
Solomon’s flight within the oral tradition – the song about Solomon’s children is an oral history, 
sung and acted out by Pilate and the children in Shalimar. Milkman initially interprets his flight 
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as metaphorical: “Solomon was the one who left, who ‘flew away’ – meaning died or ran off” 
(329). When he learns from Susan Byrd that the flying literally refers to “flying Africans, ” 
Milkman celebrates Solomon’s ability to “fly his own self” (353). Milkman focuses on 
Solomon’s individual heroism – his interpretation highlights Solomon’s name as an echo of 
“solo man” – and his own status by extension: “My great-granddaddy could flyyyyyy and the 
whole damn town is named after him” (353). However, Milkman views Solomon’s heroism in 
terms of his separation from others, his ability to “leave behind . . . Everybody” (353). Morrison 
combines the language of flight and odyssey in celebrating Solomon’s “sail[ing] on off like a 
black eagle” (353). Indeed, in several interviews Morrison links flight to “the Ulysses theme, 
the leaving home” which she sees as characteristic of black masculinity in literature (Taylor -
Guthrie 26). Her classical reference lends a heroism to what is usually a sociological critique 
of the absent black father: “He [the black male character] can leave home. Ulysses left home, 
and you all said he was a hero. But when a black character leaves home you say he is 
irresponsible. He might be on an adventure” (Taylor-Guthrie 122). Nevertheless, Morrison 
insists on the duality of heroism, in terms of both flight and odyssey: it is, after all, the children 
who are left behind who create these stories (Taylor-Guthrie 122).  The novel’s epigraph – “The 
fathers may soar / And children may know their names” –  highlights this ambivalence. There 
is an ambiguity to “may,” which connotes both the possibility and desire of transcendenta l 
flight. Flight is gendered, restricted to fathers. Whilst there is no possessive directly linking the 
children to the fathers, the third person possessive can denote both the fathers’ and the 
children’s names. This suggests that the children’s knowledge of their ancestral names is a 
substitute for the fathers themselves – the mythologisation of the father’s status (“name”) is 
created out of his absence.  
Milkman’s final flight combines elements of these other kinds of flying: “he wheeled 
toward Guitar and it did not matter which of them would give up his ghost in the killing arms 
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of his brother” (SoS 362-3). Milkman leaps towards Guitar rather than away from him, 
affirming rather than rejecting his relations to others (Farrell 147). The verb “give” suggests a 
reciprocity reminiscent of Smith. Milkman also affirms his connection to his grandfather: “he 
knew what Shalimar knew: if you surrendered to the air, you could ride it” (SoS 363). Like 
Solomon, Milkman becomes a mythic absent presence. In the phrase “would give up his ghost,” 
the future past highlights the potentiality of his death, whilst “ghost” suggests the absent 
presence of the “textual ancestor” represented by Circe – hence the narrator’s assertion that it 
does not matter whether Milkman actually dies (Krumbolz 569). Indeed, this also supports 
Ashley Tidey’s analysis of flying as representing spiritual freedom in the African flying myths. 
Tidey links flying to a ritual connection to cultural and family history: “Inasmuch as flying is a 
metaphor in this folktale [the flying myth] for death as a freeing of the spirit to ‘go back’ – back 
to Africa and one’s roots – the folktale resonates with the African cultural tradition of 
connection to ancestors as a way of ‘revitalizing’ the spirit and collective life of a community” 
(60). Milkman’s possible death is less important than the spiritual rebirth and connection with 
the dead that his flight represents. 
However, Morrison continues to encode a gendered critique of the flying myth at the 
end of the novel. Wahneema Lubiano suggests that Milkman’s flight is potentially a negative 
repetition of Solomon’s escape (112); indeed, “wheeled” (SoS 362) evokes circularity as well 
as transcendence. Moreover, Lubiano notes that Milkman’s flight is enacted over the dead body 
of Pilate, “whose lack of navel has already established her as a myth or a different reality’s 
possibility” (112). For Pilate also becomes a mythic ancestor figure. As she dies she asks 
Milkman to “Sing” (SoS 361), recalling her father’s ghost – indeed, Jakes makes a possible 
reappearance as Pilate “gaze[s] at something behind [Milkman’s] shoulder” (362). Milkman 
alters the song of Solomon to “Sugargirl don’t leave me here” (361), regendering it with himse lf 
as the abandoned lover, and changing the nature of the abandonment to death. In so doing 
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Milkman lends a heroism to Pilate’s death. They are circled by two birds, one of which “dived 
into the new grave and scooped something shiny in its beak before it flew away” (362). The 
bird’s theft of Pilate’s earring seems symbolic; and indeed, Milkman reads it as signifying a 
kind of metamorphosis: “Without ever leaving the ground, she could fly” (362). The birds might 
be read as Pilate and her father Jake, both of whose bodies now lie in the grave. 
Morrison’s use of metamorphosis mobilizes the ambiguities of Ovidian epic. Andrew 
Feldherr identifies two competing narrative structures within Ovid’s Metamorphoses, which 
hinge on how we read the transformations in the poem. Firstly, metamorphosis can be read in 
terms of stability (170). Here the essence of a person is preserved in their new form; 
metamorphosis creates an aetiology which explains the present in terms of the past (e.g. myrrh 
comes from the tears of Myrrha). However, if we read the metamorphosis with a focus on the 
person who is changed, it becomes a break, a “shutting down of an individual consciousness”; 
the poem becomes disjointed and episodic, instead of epic and linear (174). Feldherr argues that 
both narrative forms are coded into the poem, which encourages ambivalence: “Ovid often 
positions metamorphoses at the end of episodes . . . [where] the structure of the work as a whole 
is most up for grabs. In deciding whether each metamorphosis marks an ending, or merely a 
transition, readers are continually confronted with the question of what kind of work they are 
reading” (169). Similarly, Morrison positions Pilate’s death at the end of her novel. The (absent) 
presence of Jake also reminds us of his invocation, “You can’t just fly off and leave a body,” 
which this in turn evokes Ovid’s subject of “forms changed into new bodies” (in nova . . . 
mutatas . . . formas / corpora [Metamorphoses 1.1-2]).  Morrison seems to question the 
possibility of transcendental flight whilst remaining oneself – whether Pilate can indeed fly 
without leaving the ground.  
Morrison plays with Ovidian metamorphosis through language. Ovid frequently uses 
the technique of nomen omen (names as a sign of who someone really is). For example, Lycaon 
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becomes a wolf: lykos means wolf in Greek, and the transformation also literalizes his bestial 
personality. As Feldherr notes, the technique makes metamorphosis a “clarification,” both of 
Lycaon as a person and of language, since “verbal signs now more clearly represent the world” 
(170). Similarly, Pilate’s transformation into a bird literalizes the meaning of her name as 
“pilot.” However, just as Lycaon requires a translation of Latin into Greek for the 
metamorphosis to work (lupus to lykos), so the transformation of “Pilate” to “pilot” opens up 
the signifying possibilities of language even as they seem to lock into place. The bird flies off 
with Pilate’s earring, which represents not only her name but its multiple meanings and 
histories: it contains the piece of paper with her father’s writing; it is made from Sing’s box and 
a brooch stolen by Circe. Pilate’s name may live on through the bird, but its personal, historica l 
meanings, actualized through her life, do not. It is also possible that Milkman reads the earring 
itself as a stand-in for Pilate; but again, the importance of Pilate herself in creating its meanings 
suggests that this also misses the point. As such Morrison both represents Milkman’s epic 
journey (which itself transforms the epic tradition) and highlights what is omitted and lost in 
the production of such mythic narratives. 
Indeed, Morrison frames Milkman’s heroic journey in terms of narcissism. Early in the 
novel, Milkman examines his reflection in the mirror: “it lacked coherence, a coming together 
of the features into a total self” (SoS 79). His third-person externalization of his “self” recalls 
the paradoxical language which characterizes Ovid’s Narcissus (Metamorphoses 3.440-70). 
Morrison extends these themes of the gaze, blindness and heroic masculinity to Milkman’s 
epiphany during the hunt. Milkman’s sense of isolated heroism is an illusion: “Maybe the glow 
of hero worship (twice removed) that had bathed him in Danville had also blinded him” (SoS 
299). Milkman realizes that his status is dependent on others – the community and his relations. 
Abandoned in the woods, “his self – the cocoon that was ‘personality’ – gave way. He could 
barely see his own hand, and couldn’t see his feet. He was only his breath, coming slower now, 
Baxter 58 
 
and his thoughts. The rest of him had disappeared” (300). Morrison’s language of light, 
blindness and invisibility recalls Invisible Man. However, Milkman is invisible to himself rather 
than others. His absence of a self-image allows him to think more clearly, “unobstructed . . . by 
the sight of himself” (300). The passage recalls Morrison’s commitment to “write without the 
white gaze,” in contrast to Ellison (Denard 235).  Morrison is interested in the gaze and its 
relation to subjectivity, as well as race and gender, but she locates her treatment of these themes 
within African American families and communities.  
 For example, Hagar’s rejection of her hair and “groundhog appearance” critiques racism 
without centering the white gaze: she is rejected by Milkman, not white people.  Hagar seems 
to recover when she “[sees] a tiny part of her face reflected in the mirror” (SoS 333). She 
immediately sets out to transform her appearance with make-up and clothes (335), but these are 
destroyed when she is caught in the rain. As Michael Awkward notes, Hagar “sets out 
enthusiastically to achieve the bourgeois society’s ideal of beauty” and fades away when she 
realizes that will never fulfil this ideal (“Unruly and Let Loose” 493-4). Her obsession with 
obtaining Milkman's love is quite “logical”: whereas Milkman escapes bourgeois standards by 
embarking on an epic journey, Hagar is limited to “oppressive domestic plots,” where she 
cannot escape the role of the “abandoned female lover in the Western epic” (493). Hagar’s 
collapse thus explores the gendered limits of heroic subjectivity: Chapter 13 “interrup ts 
Milkman’s monomythic quest . . . in order to expose phallocentric myth’s failure to inscribe 
usefully transcendent possibilities for the female” (494).  
Indeed, Ryna provides a mythic template of the abandoned woman, although her 
ambiguous status as Solomon’s “wife” refers to the family’s enslavement rather than her lover’s 
lack of commitment. The phallic and yonic formations of Solomon’s “big double-headed rock” 
and Ryna’s “ravine” gender their mythic roles (SoS 348). When Milkman hears the “sound of 
the sobbing woman” on his hunting trip, Calvin explains it as “Echo. . . Ryna’s Gulch” (297). 
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Here Roynon identifies an explicit allusion to the Echo and Narcissus episode in Ovid’s 
Metamorphoses, which both “indicates [Ryna and Hagar’s] lamentable lack of subjectivity 
without a male partner” and “illuminates Milkman’s narcissism” (155). Hagar recalls Echo in 
the repetitive language of her final scenes: “No wonder . . . No wonder” (SoS 333). However, 
Hagar is also implicated in the language of mirrors and the gaze. She responds to her refection 
in the “compact mirror” (333), and “it [is] in [Pilate and Reba’s] eyes that she saw what she had 
not seen in the mirror: the wet ripped hose, the soiled white dress” (340). Morrison thus links 
the apparent narcissism of Hagar’s concern to internalized racism and misogyny. Moreover, by 
linking Hagar to Narcissus as well as Echo, Morrison reminds the reader of Milkman’s role in 
Hagar’s collapse. She also maintains the Ovidian mirroring between Narcissus and Echo – 
rejection of others is in a way similar to rejection of self, and healthy identity requires a working 
through of both. 
Morrison’s use of Ovid also supports the ambivalence of the novel’s ending. Milkman’s 
words echo: “‘Guitar!’ he shouted. / Tar tar tar, said the hills. . . . ‘Here I am!’/ Am am am, said 
the rocks” (362). As Roynon notes, these repetitions question the extent to which Milkman 
moves beyond his narcissism (155). In addition, critics have read Milkman’s conflict with 
Guitar as the hero’s archetypal victory over an enemy, who is also his double (Harris 74, Lee 
69). The allusion to Narcissus undermines the success of this form of heroic identity, and indeed 
Guitar and Milkman mirror each other across the ravine and collapse indeterminably into each 
other’s “killing arms” (SoS 363). The ending also extends Morrison’s gendered critique of myth 
- the echoes evoke absent female presences – and her interest in language. Morrison both 
explores the transformative potential of signifying language and leaves open the possibility of 
narcissistic echo: the song Milkman sings to Pilate is perhaps not a transformation of myth but 
a repetition of “worn old words” (362).  
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4. Conclusion 
I hope to have shown that both Invisible Man and Song of Solomon make significant use 
of Greek and Latin literature and can therefore be considered evidence of black classicism. Still, 
Ellison and Morrison do not use the classics as an end in themselves. The classics do not serve 
to elevate the novels within the epic tradition or canon of Western literature. Rather Ellison and 
Morrison use classical allusions to question the notions of origins, authority, cultural purity and 
hierarchy which the classics have been used to assert. Ellison and Morrison play with archetypal 
ideas of myth only to undermine their universal relevance. Their classical allusions do not 
explain black culture in white Western terms but multiply the ambivalent relations between 
these categories. In addition, these authors use the classics within a historically and politica l ly 
specific context. They highlight that the classical tradition is not a timeless representation of 
universal human values but a indeed tradition, appropriated and transformed to historically and 
politically specific ends. The novels critique the use of classics in the construction of a white 
America, from the Founding Fathers to Enlightenment racial discourse, slavery, education and 
the legal system. They question the relevance of classical ideas for African American politics 
and culture, for example in the context of heroic individualism and leadership. At the same 
time, Ellison and Morrison shortcut white America’s claim on the classical tradition by directly 
linking features of classical and African American culture, such as the call-and-response of the 
tragic chorus and its protagonist. They show both that classics is a historically conservative 
tradition and that it holds subversive potential. 
Whilst I have argued that Invisible Man and Song of Solomon differ in style and focus 
(with Morrison often reacting against Ellison), the commitment to difference is ultimately a key 
similarity between them. They show that cultural identity, in the words of Stuart Hall, is “not 
an essence, but a positioning” (226); nor is there only one way to be black. As Morrison asserts, 
“One of the modern qualities of being an African American is the flux, is the fluidity, is the 
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contradictions, is being Miles Davis and Louis Armstrong and Bessie Smith and Kathleen 
Battle” (Denard 61). Ellison and Morrison dramatize the problems and contradictions of 
identity rather than offering solutions. Their novels display a classicism informed by African 
American experience; at the same time, they challenge the very idea of a “black classicism” 
whereby classical and African American cultures can be safely opposed, and the concerns of 
black classicism isolated from a classicism proper. As I hope to have shown, Ellison and 
Morrison deconstruct cultural oppositions even as they explore them. In examining the 
relationship between classical and African American culture, Ellison and Morrison contest the 
boundaries of American and African American identity, classicism and black classicism, 
challenging notions of cultural purity and yet showing the importance of cultural identity and 
cultural difference. “Black classicism” might seem a specialized area of classical scholarship, 
but it questions the foundation of classics – what we consider the classics to be and why we 
should study it.   
Indeed, Invisible Man and Song of Solomon can be used to reflect on the emerging 
discipline of black classicism. On the one hand, this area of research acknowledges the impact 
and perspective of black writers on the classical tradition. On the other, black classicis ts 
continue to be underrepresented in academia (Peralta). Black classicism, like classical 
reception, could be seen as an attempt to keep classics relevant. Even adding black writers to 
the canon of classical reception risks reinforcing the canon, especially since studies have 
concentrated on a handful of black writers (mainly Countee Cullen, Rita Dove, Wole Soyinka 
and Derek Walcott, in addition to Ellison and Morrison). Further research would therefore 
benefit from a focus on new authors. There has been a concentration on theatre studies but little 
attention has been paid to black classics in film. Prominent examples include Marcel Camus’ 
1959 Orpheu Negro and Spike Lee’s 2017 Chi-Raq (an adaptation of Aristophanes’ Lysistrata), 
but it would be worth tracking down other texts. Further attention could be paid to classicism 
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in black art (beyond Romare Bearden’s Black Odyssey) and music (R&B artist Adonis the 
Greek, Texan rapper Plato III; the use of Ancient Egypt in Beyoncé’s 2018 Coachella 
performance). This would be informative to literary texts as well – consider the use of art and 
music in Ellison and Morrison’s novels. The moniker of “black classicism” also risks erasing 
cultural and geographical differences between authors: further comparison of authors across 
these categories would be useful (Greenwood 606-7). Nevertheless, Invisible Man and Song of 
Solomon themselves explore the problems of similarity and difference which characterize 
“black classicism,” and their novels offer a critical toolkit for reading the classics and its 
receptions. 
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